Three essays in development economics by Dalwai, S
Three Essays in Development Economics
Submitted by
Sumedh Dalwai
to
The University of Exeter
as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
January 2019
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper
acknowledgement.
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for
the award of a degree by this or any other University.
Signature: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
ii
Acknowledgements
I thank my supervisors Surajeet Chakravarty and Pradeep Kumar for their valuable
advice and great support in my journey. I also thank Chetna Sinha, the founder of
Mann Deshi for being the mentor in both public and personal life.
I thank staff from Mann Deshi, especially Rekha Kulkarni, Anil Khandare, Shakti
Gurav, Vanita Shinde, Manisha Katte, who provided valuable insight of the organ-
isation for my research. Also, I am grateful that Prof Richard Harris and Prof
Neeraj Hatekar for comments and providing insight on the methodology and Dr
Sandhya Mhatre for providing insight into datawork. I appreciate the assistance on
the project offered by Prachi Kulkarni and Parth Sinha.
I am also thankful to Helen Bell and Kate Gannon for the compassionate support
throughout.
I appreciate Sarunas Girdenas, Satyajit Narvekar and Yamini Hule for being the
tolerant friends when it wasn’t easy to be that way.
I am grateful to Lazaros Rinotas and Inmaculada Adarves-Yorno for being my
family for half the days of last two years.
I thank my family members who have been the co-passengers on this exciting
adventure for being around with their distintive characteristics, my sister Sameena
and my brother-in-law Rajedeep Pakanati for being so cool and helpful, and my
parents for setting examples of their philosophies - my mother, Shama Dalwai for
“Not a failure but..” and my father, Husain Dalwai for “karmanye vadhikaraste..”,
Yan Huang, my wife and partner in life and a partner in so many aspects of my life,
Eshan Huang, my three-year old son, getting me across all the dark patches.
iii
iv
Overview
To find a route on the map to reach the destination, one starts by looking for the
current location. Development economics studies underdevelopment. The primary
matter of interest are the individuals, groups and societies that have lagged behind
and the reasons for the same. It is imperative to look for solutions that would help
bridge the gap. The 20th century’s debate of market orientation or intervention is
stark in 21st century development strategies for the underdeveloped. But there is
also growing consensus on making the choices based on strong empirical evidence.
The supporters of market oriented strategies put great emphasis on the efficacy of
the efficient capital markets to solve the problem of poverty. Microfinance is seen as
the magic bullet that can eradicate poverty through the market by being innovative
enough to reach out to the poor. It does that while achieving women empowerment.
How exactly it achieves the transformation of lives of the underserved is inevitably a
question of interest for a development economist. Chapter One of this thesis seeks to
explore the development of microfinance in India by looking at the experience of the
Mann Deshi Bank, which established in 1997 as the first microfinance women bank
in India. The qualitative and quantitative methods are employed to analyse the
contribution of the bank. The narratives of the borrowers of the bank highlighting
the role of credit are analyzed. Subsequently, the descriptive statistics of the joint
liability loans is reported and their growth and financial performance are discussed.
This chapter further argues that the innovative financial products introduced by
Mann Deshi to address the cash flow needs of clients can serve as a potential template
for greater financial inclusion around the world. The conclusion is on how the work
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of Mann Deshi Bank can serve as a new benchmark in the microfinance industry in
India.
It follows also to explore the strategy employed by the microfinance institutions
to enhance their performance. Most microfinance banks, which have become a
key provider of credit in developing countries use agents to acquire new borrowers,
manage the account and collect repayments. Chapter Two of this thesis studies the
incentives provided to such financial agents and the effect such incentives had on the
outcome desired by the microfinance bank. Mann Deshi Bank, a microfinance bank
operating in western India, changed its remuneration scheme from pure commission
to a mix scheme with a combination of a base salary and other incentives. This
chapter examines the effect it had on the effort and the output of the agents by
using a panel data of 39 agents working on the bank’s joint liability lending product
for five years. The results show that although the bank was able to reduce its wage
bills for the loan product, it came with the poorer performance by the agents. The
supply of credit to new borrowers reduced, both in terms of the rate of reaching out to
new borrowers as well as the loan amount disbursed to them. However, interestingly,
borrowers delay their repayments less with the new agents on the mixed contract.
On the other hand not just for the supporters of the interventionism but also for
all for the sake of curbing the market failure arising due to public goods, the efficiency
of the government to deliver remains of great interest. Enabling the citizens to
monitor their government through a right to information is hoped to improve the
public goods distribution. To what extent it indeed happens, if it does and does
it particularly show any potential in achieving the developmental goals quicker is
currently a burning question. Chapter three of this thesis considers the efficacy of
Right to Information Act (RTI) in India for achieving developmental goals for poor
Indian citizens. Nations worldwide have enacted freedom to information to provide
greater transparency to government operations and to allow citizens to monitor their
governments more effectively. Does this lead to better public services? The efficacy
of the RTI since its inception in 1997 is analyzed. Also, the kind of public goods
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which can be improved is identified. Lastly, whether these public goods are beneficial
for the poor population is examined. Two indicators are applied; electrification and
health. Electrification is used to understand how much attention a state pays to its
rural voter- since electrification is nearly complete in urban India but many rural
areas either do not have electricity connections or do not receive any electricity
the whole week. For health, an analysis of effect of RTI is employed on infant
mortality. Infant mortality is a key health outcome and a good indicator of the
quality of health care provision in a society. So a more accountable government due
to RTI will provide better health care and therefore the state or country is likely
to have lower infant mortality. The key explanatory variable in the study is RTI
implementation.
vii
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Chapter 1
Evaluating the development of
microfinance through Mann Deshi
Bank
1
2
Abstract
This chapter seeks to explore the development of microfinance in India by looking
at the experience of the Mann Deshi Bank, which established in 1997 as the first
microfinance women bank in India. The qualitative and quantitative methods are
employed to analyse the contribution of the bank. The narratives of the borrowers of
the bank highlighting the role of credit are analyzed. Subsequently, the descriptive
statistics of the joint liability loans is reported and their growth and financial per-
formance are discussed. This chapter argues that the innovative financial products
introduced by Mann Deshi to address the cash flow needs of clients can serve as
a potential template for greater financial inclusion around the world. The conclu-
sion is on how the work of Mann Deshi Bank can serve as a new benchmark in the
microfinance industry in India.
3
1.1 Introduction
One of the ingredients of economic development of a nation is the availability of
credit to entrepreneurs(Banerjee 2003). However, the poor entrepreneurs due to
a lack of collateral are unable to prove their creditworthiness to financial institu-
tions.For example, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) show examples of the poor in India
who rely heavily on borrowing from informal sources such as relatives or money
lenders. Therefore, they continue to remain poor as they are without any access to
capital for investment(Galor and Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997).
The microfinance movement was started by a noted economist, Professor Muhammed
Yunus in 1970s. He started to lend small loans to villagers by using his own money
to help them buy materials for projects, which led to the foundation of the Grameen
Bank in 1976 in Bangladesh. The strategy adopted by this bank was to encourage
the formation of groups to avail credit rather than seeking credit as individual bor-
rowers. These groups came from the rural households who were poor and would have
been ineligible for borrowing as individual borrowers. People were invited to form
groups from different households. Initially, only a single sex was allowed within a
group. During the first few years, there were more male groups than female groups.
But by the 1990s, nearly all the groups were made up of only women1.
The first generation of Grameen model is to have a group of five borrowers. Once
a group was formed, compulsory savings were required to be deposited into a joint
account and could not be withdrawn for ten years. 8 groups would meet in one
Centre regularly to repay the loans. The repayment of a loan was a fixed amount
each week over a year. The interest rate was about 20% which was similar to the
borrowing rate for unsecured loans in the United States2. If the repayment was on
time and there was no default, a bigger loan could be granted. This lending model
was successful for almost a decade with a repayment rate above 98%3. However,
when there was a severe flood in 1998, lots of households suffered losses. This led
1http://grameenresearch.org/history-of-grameen-bank/
2http://www.grameen-info.org/grameen-bank-interest-rate/
3http://www.muhammadyunus.org/index.php/design-lab/previous-design-labs/37about/about/371-grameen-
bank-at-a-glance
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to an increase in the default rate of the loans. It even made it difficult for the
bank to boost its capital. The rigid and inflexible rules were the major roadblocks.
Once a borrower defaulted, especially under a shock, it was very difficult for her to
come back on track under those rules. Therefore, certain changes were proposed by
Professor Yunus to reshape the scheme. One change was to make the single loan
term and repayment schedule to longer terms up to 3 years . Also, if new loans
were required for new investment, a top-up of the original loan amount was allowed.
If a member cannot repay, the loan term can be rescheduled to longer period with
lower instalment. All these approaches considered uncertain cash flow patterns of
poor households and gave them more flexibility when defaults were not under their
control. This modified version of joint liability loans found success and caught the
attention of economists and policy makers.
Attempts at financial inclusion were mainly interventionary in the early decade
of post-colonial period in developing countries. This standardized JLG products
made commercialization of microfinance possible. For example, BancoSal in Bolivia
and Bandhan Bank in India successfully completed the conversion to microfinance
bank. According to the Microfinance Barometer (2018)4 issued by Convergences,
microfinance financial institutions in the world had a client base of 139 million with
loan size of USD 114 billion by 2017. The total loan amount increase continues its
momentum from 2015 (8.6%) to 2017 (15.6%). However, the number of borrowers
has decreased from 2015 (13.4%) to 2017 (5.6%). Latin American (44%) and Asian
(24%) countries top the list in terms of total loan amount issued by microfinance
institutions.
This case study is important for comparison with formal banking system, partic-
ularly in terms of institutions, borrowers and mechanisms. Institutions and borrow-
ers (and their needs) are not the same in microfinance as compared to the formal
banking system. Mechanisms are studied and quantitative methods have also been
applied (e.g. Mersland and Strom, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2015). However, the quali-
4Microfinance Barometer 2018 http://www.convergences.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/BMF_2018_EN_-
VFINALE.pdf
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tative understanding of microfinance institutions and borrowers, attempted to offer
in this chapter, is needed for the understanding of microfinance mechanisms to be
well grounded. Borrowers types and their needs are different for microfinance. For
finding solutions to their types and needs, different mechanisms are innovated. To
deliver these tailored mechanisms for the particular type of clientele, the institutions
are evolved accordingly. On the one hand, borrowers’ needs change, on the other
hand, untapped borrowers also come within the purview of microfinance institu-
tions. This requires further innovations in mechanisms. However, the efficiency of
delivering any mechanism depends on the way the institutional structure is evolved.
In the process of structural evolution, institution’s capacity to deliver certain kind
of mechanisms enhances. Hence, it is imperative to have a qualitative study of the
types of borrowers, their needs and the institutions that are catering to their needs.
Many of the institutions in this sector are social enterprises and might be profit
making organisations but are not necessarily run as a profit motive. The observation
in qualitative work helps in understanding the perspective of the people running
the social enterprise. This in turn is crucial to grasp the intentions behind their
decisions. While quantitative studies in microfinance underline economic rationale
of market model, qualitative studies are able to update the assumptions to better
frame the economic theory.
This chapter seeks to evaluate the development of microfinance in India by looking
at the experience of the Mann Deshi Bank, which established in 1997 as the first
microfinance women bank in India. The next section presents a critical literature
review of microfinance, followed by an overview of microfinance in India. This
paper utilizes a mixed-method - qualitative and quantitative analysis, to assess
microfinance operations in India. The third and fourth qualitative sections capture
the story of the Mann Deshi group and its work. They also paint a picture through
the stories of the borrowers of Mann Deshi Bank. In the fifth section, an empirical
analysis of the joint liability loans of the bank’s borrowers is carried out. The sixth
section then sheds light on an innovative financial product introduced to address
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the cash flow needs of clients by the bank, that can serve as a potential template
for greater financial inclusion around the world. The final section concludes the
chapter by showing how the work of Mann Deshi Bank serves as a new benchmark
in microfinance operations in India.
1.2 Microfinance
Microfinance aims at providing small loans/savings/insurance to low income house-
holds, especially the ones who are excluded from the formal banking sector. It is
being evaluated as a celebration of the marriage of poverty alleviation with capital-
ism.
A big portion of the literature sheds light on the mechanisms of microfinance
which are successful in generating higher repayment rates. Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999) points out four potential problems which would affect loan repayment neg-
atively when comparing formal banking institutions and microfinance institutions.
They are adverse selection, moral hazard, auditing and enforcement problems. Joint
liability adopted by microfinance institutions (MFIs) is supposed to mitigate asym-
metric information between borrowers and banks. Therefore, the first three problems
can be targeted (Banerjee et al. 1994; Stiglitz, 1990; Karlan, 2007). Enforcement
problems can be addressed through social sanctions which are against defaulters
and not possessed by financial institutions. However, there are still some unresolved
issues in microfinance. For instance, hidden costs, collusion of borrowers, emerging
tensions, group formation and size etc. (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Armendariz
and Morduch, 2000) call for more research and finding solutions.
A great deal of the literature also attempts to look into the determinants of the
success of microfinance beyond group lending. On the one hand, some studies argue
that dynamic incentives such as threatening to stop lending or progressive lending
play a role in improving loan performance (Besley, 1995; Godquin 2004). On the
other hand, frequent repayment schedule does not only help borrowers to establish
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financial discipline but also utilize social ties so as to reduce default rates(Besley
and Coates, 1995; Abbink et al. 2006). Other incentive schemes such as making
repayment public, cross-reporting, information collected by staff and so on also show
positive impact on loan performance (Rai and Sjostrom, 2004).
1.2.1 Issues addressed by microfinance
Lack of collateral
Lending contract is exposed to issues such as adverse selection, moral hazard and
non-enforceability. For a well functioning debt market these issues are needed to have
resolved. Usually, collateral is the solution. As long as the value of the collateral, at
least to the borrower, is higher than the debt, it attracts the right type of borrowers,
aligns the choices of borrowers regarding the utilisation of the loan to that of the
interest of the lender and motivates the borrowers to repay. Lending to the poor
becomes challenging with poor people’s inability to offer collateral. At lower income
marginal propensity to save might be low leading to lower creation of wealth. Even
when there are assets owned by the poor, these may not come with well defined
property rights. (De Soto, 2007) This reduces the value of the asset. Hence, poor
are not able to offer a collateral leading to a market failure in the debt market for
the poor.
Adverse selection
One problem of credit market failure is adverse selection due to asymmetric informa-
tion between lenders and borrowers. Banks cannot easily differentiate safe and risky
borrowers, especially when there is weak enforcement of repayment. This will even-
tually make the lending program more attractive to risky borrowers and crowd out
safe ones. Then banks will end up with loans exposing to ‘bad risks’. Group lending
is considered to provide a screening mechanism by taking advantage of information
available among borrowers to mitigate the problems of adverse selection. The theo-
retical models proposed by Varian (1990) and Ghatak (1999) support the ‘positive
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assortative matching’ which shows borrowers to cluster by themselves according to
their own risk profile. Borrowers who are similar types have more incentive to form
groups so as to protect their own interests (Stiglitz, 1990). This relies on the close
ties between individuals who can assess the ability of their group members to re-
pay. This model can be utilized only when the financial institution allows groups to
self-form.
In addition, Guttman (2008) constructs a theoretical model and argues that when
there is financing threat, the positive assortative matching does not hold. He shows
that the marginal effect on the probability of group default, to a safe borrower is
less than the corresponding marginal effect, to a risky borrower. Therefore, risky
borrowers would be willing to pay more to have a safe borrower as a group member
than a safe borrower is willing to pay. However, when there is absence of side-
payment, safe borrowers are preferred by both safe and risky borrowers. Kritikos
and Vigenina (2005) investigate 108 groups in Constanta. The group quality vari-
able is constructed by asking group members to give an assessment on her group
members’ riskiness of projects. The results show the positive correlation between
the group quality and the subject’s own risk quality. This provides evidence of
assortative matching. However, it is still debatable whether the performance of ho-
mogeneous groups is better than the heterogeneous groups. Zeller (1998) suggests
that the homogeneous risk among group members would have negative impact on
loan repayment. Moreover, more profitable and higher risk projects, which would
spread risks among members, could be chosen by members.
Moral hazard
Peer monitoring enables microfinance institutions to mitigate the issue of moral
hazard (Wenner 1995; Stiglitz 1990). Because group members would lose access to
future credit if the group defaults, they have incentives to monitor each other and
to enforce repayments through potential social sanctions. Hence, the default rates
can be reduced and debt repayments can be strengthened (Armendariz de Aghion,
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1999). Even when monitoring cost is high, Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) claim
that loan repayment can be improved through group lending. Although Stiglitz
(1990) firstly identify peer monitoring in the context of group lending, he assumes
an enforceable contract can be made by group members to choose certain projects.
These assumptions are not realistic since the court cost could be high. Wydick
(1999) shows evidence that members’ monitoring costs affect the repayment rate
negatively. Furthermore, willingness to utilize social sanctions on defaulters play
important roles in mitigating moral hazard problems.
Enforcement
Even when information is symmetric between borrowers and financial institutions,
the enforcement problem still exists. It is either too costly or difficult to enforce
the loan contract for a financial institution when there is a default. Sometimes even
the threat of future loans might not work. Enforcement of loans can be enhanced
through group lending which can impose sanctions on group members who have
defaulted irresponsibly. Sanctions include social ostracism, or even more aggressive
measures such as seizing the delinquent member’s property. Montgomery et al.
(1996) document cases of property loss of defaulters in Bangladesh. As observed by
Besley and Coate (1995), when there is a default in a group, group members have
incentives to apply sanctions even if it is costly because they might lose access to
future loans. They also compare group lending with individual lending and conclude
that loan performance in terms of repayment rates is better in group lending if
social sanctions are imposed. Wydick (1999) examines 137 Guatemalan groups
and concludes that peer monitoring and intra-group insurance drives the success
of group lending whereas social sanctions just play a secondary and supporting
role. He argues that in the area where social ties are strong, group members are
more compassionate towards the one who defaults. Then the group lending loses
its charm. Paxton et al. (2000) find that social ties are more important than social
sanction. Most of defaulters in the sample are categorized as uncontrollable reasons
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rather than irresponsible or negligent behaviour. So little or no pressure is placed.
This is consistent as the findings of Zeller (1998).
Strategies
Theoretical models have assigned the success of group lending in addressing adverse
selection and moral hazard problems to joint liability and its exploitation of exist-
ing social capital. Besley and Coate (1995) show that strategic default is reduced
if the social sanctions borrowers can impose on their joint liability group members
are severe enough, such that the credible threat of social sanctions is sufficient to
induce higher repayment in joint liability group lending than in individual lending.
Armendáriz de Aghion (1999) shows that strategic default among borrowers can be
prevented if the cost of monitoring is sufficiently low relative to the size of possible
social sanctions. By relying on the assumption that only strategic default is pun-
ished, both models explain high repayment in joint-liability group lending but they
fail to explain positive levels of punishment in equilibrium (Czura 2015, 120-121).
This study pushes the discussion from the standard microfinance investment game
on strategic default, put forward Abbink et al. (2006) and Cassar et al. (2007).
As MFIs are consolidating their operations, the need to increase profits or ef-
ficient management of operations is becoming an imperative for them. A study
by Kodongo and Kendi (2013) compares individual lending versus group lending
suggests a possible way out – i.e. to establish a form of credit risk assessment of
individual borrowers in a group and then target them for offering progressive indi-
vidual loans. This is also important for policy making as there is a need to promote
stability in the macro-environment where decision makers have to ensure interest
rates charged by microfinance institutions remain not just stable but also affordable.
Carli and Urasb (2017) look at proposing different structures for loan contracts
and move beyond the joint liability which is the key to loans by MFIs. While
existing knowledge about the structure of JLGs suggests that there should be a
leader the question that arises, is how to choose such a leader? While exploiting
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exogenous characteristics of loan applicants is sometimes utilized to appoint a group
leader, this study suggests that when faced with homogeneity in borrowers a possible
solution can be found by providing an implementation scheme that assigns the group
leadership by the outcome of a lottery whose realization is unknown at the time the
contract is signed.
Mersland and Strøm (2010) address the question of financial viability of MFIs and
examines whether maturing MFIs move away from their core purpose – i.e. provide
lending to very poor borrowers and who are not catered to by ordinary bankers.
The paper after looking at the experience of MFIs over 11 years using data from
rated MFIs in 74 countries for the period from 1998 to 2008 finds that the average
loan size (which is used as a proxy for moving away from their mission) has not
increased. They also measure mission drift by looking at MFIs outreach towards
women, from group lending to individual lending; and operating in rural areas. The
main argument that they imply is that mission drift may occur if an MFI seeks
higher financial returns, but that this effect is neutralized if the MFI is more cost
efficient. They argue that the more cost effective an MFI is, the smaller the average
loan. A prediction can thus be made that further efforts to reduce costs will result
in MFIs reaching out to even poorer segments, when profitability is at the same
level. Rather than concentrating on an MFIs "commercialization", attention should
be focused on how to reduce costs per client. This work complements the work by
Cull, Demiguc Kunt, and Morduch (2007) which is the only larger cross-country
study to address mission drift. Using a sample of 124 MFIs in 49 countries, they
find that MFIs can stay true to their mission even when they aggressively pursue
financial goals.
Pal and Mitra (2017) look at the changing nature of MFIs, from working to serve
a purpose of expanding financial reach to seeking profit raises a question whether
there is any change in the nature of MFIs. One possible effect of seeking profit
was to assign more loan borrowers to each loan officers, which raised the question
whether in seeking run a more cost-efficient operation MFIs original purpose can
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be affected. The focus on loan officers monitoring loan repayments is needed as
it has been found to be effective for micro-lending apart from peer selection, peer
monitoring and joint liability. It uses dataset with information from 1,575 MFIs
from 109 countries for the period 2006-2013 and finds that there is no corroborative
evidence that there is a trade-off between the number of borrowers per loan office
and MFI asset quality. MFIs have reaped the benefit of economies of scale.
1.2.2 Microfinance in India
According to the World Bank5,the total number of adults without a bank account
over the age of 15 in India is 190 million which accounts for 14% population in 2017.
A two fold growth of the banked population during the period of 2011 and 2017
was due to the strong push of biometric identification card by the government. For
example, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY), launched in 2014, gave
every household a bank account and basic insurance cover. This flagship scheme of
the government attracted a crowd of 15 million on the day it was launched6. Later
on, the license to payments banks and small finance banks and the launch of Micro
Unit Development and Refinance Agency in 20157 showed the determination of the
government to promote financial inclusion to the poor. The account ownership for
women experienced a rapid increase of 30% between 2014 and 2017. But still 60%
of un-banked adults are women.8 Based on the census in 2011, 46% of households
in the rural areas and 32% of households in the urban areas do not have access to
banking services.9
Microfinance segment plays a key role to bridge the gap between the unbanked
population with the formal banking system. Microfinance financial intuitions (MFIs)
in India reached out 50.9 million low-income borrowers by 2017 with a Year on YoY
5https://www.bankbazaar.com/saving-schemes/pradhan-mantri-jan-dhan-yojana.html?ck=Y-
%2BziX71XnZjIM9ZwEflsyDYlRL7gaN4W0xhuJSr9Iq7aMYwRm2IPACTQB2XBBtGG&rc=1
6https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/pm-jan-dhan-yojana-launched-1-5-crore-bank-
accounts-opened-in-a-day/articleshow/41093413.cms
7https://www.mudra.org.in/
8https://www.bankbazaar.com/saving-schemes/pradhan-mantri-jan-dhan-yojana.html?ck=Y-
%2BziX71XnZjIM9ZwEflsyDYlRL7gaN4W0xhuJSr9Iq7aMYwRm2IPACTQB2XBBtGG&rc=1
9http://www.censusindia.gov.in/vital_statistics/SRS_Reports.html
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growth rate of 5.8%. India is the country with the largest number of borrowers
borrowing from MFIs. The loan portfolio also increased by 26.3% in 2017 amount-
ing to USD 17.1 billion.10 There are around 165 microfinance lenders by March
2018 including banks, small finance banks (SFBs), non-banking financial companies
(NBFCs), and non-banking financial companies - microfinance institutions (NBFC-
MFIs) in the microfinance sector(MFIN 2017-18 report)11. Based on the data of
140 MFIs collected by Sa-Dhan in 2017 in figure 1.1 and figure 1.2, the association
of community development finance institutions, NBFC-MFIs took the lead in client
outreach and loan portfolio size with percentages of 41% and 31% respectively. SFBs
followed NBFC-MFIs with market share of 26% and 30% in terms of client outreach
and loan portfolio size. Banks fell behind SFBs marginally with market shares of
22% and 28% accordingly. The strong growth in microfinance can be attributed
both to the demand of the market and to RBI’s agenda of extending credit to the
poor. For example, RBI requires all domestic banks with at least 20 branches to
have at least 40% of loans lent to the priority sector, which MFIs are categorized as.
Moreover, the agriculture, micro enterprises and weaker sections should be allocated
at least 18%, 7.5% and 10% of loans. However, the public sector banks tend to fall
short of the target set by RBI12. In 2017, they fell short of 7.5% of the target. The
current solution for the shortfall is to require the banks to contribute to the Rural
Infrastructure Development Fund for further allocation13. To control the portfolio
risk and encourage lending to the poor, banks are allowed to have unsecured loans
of 10%. However, Mann Deshi bank’s priority lending takes up 90% of its loan
portfolio. Later on, RBI issued a circular in April 2016 to allow any banks which
have more than 90% priority lending to increase the proportion of unsecured loans
from 10% to 35%.14 Mann Deshi bank is so far the only bank meeting the criteria
according to the CEO of the bank.
10http://www.convergences.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/BMF_2018_EN_VFINALE.pdf
11http://mfinindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Annual-Report-2017-18.pdf
12https://m.rbi.org.in/Scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=87
13https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/money-and-banking/banks-can-now-meet-their-msme-priority-sector-
lending-target-better/article22682033.ece
14https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10361&Mode=0
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The flagship loan products microfinance institutions offer are based on joint li-
ability of borrowers since the clients do not have collateral and cannot access the
formal banking system. There are two major types of joint liability models in India.
One is Self-Help Groups (SHGs) which consist normally of 10-20 people. The other
is Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) with about 5 people in one group.
In the early 1970s, informal SHGs came up as an effective tool in the rural areas
to provide credits to the poor in rural India. The fundamental of this model is
mutual trust and peer pressure. In 1992, National Bank For Agriculture and Rural
Development launched a pilot program targeted 500 SHGs to allow banks to finance
SHGs. The success of the program in the next few years built up the confidence for
the Reserve Bank of India to implement this practice to connect the unbanked with
the formal financial services in the whole banking system in 1996.15 This SHG-Bank
Linkage Program, which is the largest microfinance program in the world, reached
110 million households and totaled outstanding loan of Rs. 75,500 crore in 2017.16
Although this model still prevails in the movement of outreach of the poor, there
are problems. For example, the group can apply for loans only after regular saving
in 6 months. This creates a threshold for easy access to credit. Also the allocation
of a loan within a group is discretionary among group members.This limits the use
of fund being allocated to the one who is in need of credit but lack of power within
the group. These restrictions result in high NPA of 6.5%17 compared with the NPA
(0.5%)18 of joint liability loans with smaller group members.
MFIs and banks replicated the model with fewer group members and received
great success in 2000s. According to the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development, the number of joint liability groups was 1.2 million during the period
from 2017 to 2018 in India. And the loan disbursed to JLGs amounted to Rs. 13,955
crore. The cumulative joint liability groups by March 2018 were 3.5 million and
15https://www.nabard.org/CircularPage.aspx?cid=504&id=2882
16Status of Microfinance in India 2017-18 https://www.nabard.org/auth/writereaddata/tender/-
1907183104SMFI%202017-18.pdf
17The Bharat Microfinance Report 2017 http://indiamicrofinance.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/The-
Bharat-Microfinace-Report-2017-Final.pdf
18https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/money/indian-microfinance-industry-will-continue-to-
demonstrate-sustainable-growth/articleshow/58311757.cms
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the total amount was Rs. 40,803 crore19. Due to favorable regulations and strong
demand for loans from borrowers who are not reached by the formal financial sector,
the period of 2005 to 2010 witnessed an exponential growth in the commercialization
of microfinance sector.
SKS Microfinance, the largest MFIs in 2007, became the first Indian microfi-
nance IPO in 2010 and attracted interests from NGOs to hedge funds from abroad.
It was 13 times over subscribed and eventually the IPO raised $358 million20. Span-
dana Sphoorty and SHARE Microfin, the second and third largest players, were also
planning to go public21. This exponential growth came to a screeching halt when
it was stopped by the Andhra Pradesh crisis in 2010. An ordinance on MFIs was
promulgated by the state government in response to the increasing media coverage
of suicide incidents of microfinance clients. MFIs were blamed for their high interest
rate, multiple lending and intimidating collection practices which mirrored the prac-
tices of moneylenders. The act restricted the operation of the MFIs (registration
with the government, government approval required for every second loan issued to
the same client, public collection rather than door to door collection of repayment
etc.)22 and it had an immediate effect on the MFI repayment rate which fell from
99% to 20%23. It is interesting to note that 57 branches of SHARE and Spandana
were closed in 200624, due to similar problematic practices blamed in 2010 but did
not raise a similar public outcry despite reportage of many cases of suicides. The pe-
riod from 2010 to 2016 witnessed the reshuffle of microfinance sector with a number
of MFIs shutdown.
In 2011, RBI categorized MFIs as Non-Banking Finance Companies (NBFCs).
It recommended a margin cap of 10% with a loan portfolio of Rs. 100 crore and
24% for interest on individual loans for MFIs. However after April 2014, RBI lifted
19Status of Microfinance in India 2017-18 https://www.nabard.org/auth/writereaddata/tender/-
1907183104SMFI%202017-18.pdf
20https://www.reuters.com/article/sksmicrofinance-ipo-price-idUSSGE67209X20100803
21https://www.livemint.com/Money/xLwf7CWnl81a2JBzV9fUgL/After-SKS-success-Share-Microfin-Spandana-
Sphoorty-may-go.html
22https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Z3YLSgcdQxb4VygrbRW6EL/Microfinance-To-hell-and-back.html
23https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/microfinance-crisis-mfis-with-sizeable-
presence-in-andhra-pradesh-on-the-brink-of-closure/articleshow/7272192.cms
24Ghate, P.,(2007) Consumer protection in Indian Microfinance: Lessons from Andhra Prasdesh and the Micro-
finance Bill, Economics and Political Weekly 42(13),1176-1184
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the cap to help MFIs to link interest rate with their cost of funds. MFIs can
choose the lower interest rate between the cost of funds with a maximum 10%
margin or 2.75 times of the average based rate of the top five commercial banks25.
Also, in 2014, Microfinance Institutions Networks (MFIN), established in 2009, was
appointed by the Reserve Bank of India to be the self-regulatory organization for
the microfinance sector. MFIN has 90% of microfinance players including NFBF-
MFIs registered as members/associates with them26. There was a strong push by
the Reserve Bank of India to transform MFIs into SFBs. In 2015, 10 institutions
were granted the licence of small finance bank and 8 of them were MFIs27. RBI
also set up mandatory requirements to maintain the agenda of serving the poor for
SFBs. For example, "75% of their adjusted net bank credit (ANBC) will go towards
priority sector lending and 50% of the loan portfolio will constitute loans up to
Rs.2.5 million"(RBI, 2014)28. Although SFBs now have access to more capital and
a more diverse loan portfolio, they are regulated by RBIs.
Microfinance experiences impressive growth over the last few decades in India.
With an increasing client base who have completed multiple loan cycles and more
of them getting connected to the formal banking, it is time to review the future
of microfinance. Microfinance helps the poor who does not have collateral to get
joint liability loans to build up their credit record. But borrowers might still not
be eligible to join the formal banking system due to insufficient collateral even
after the completion of microfinance loan cycles. One effective dynamic incentive
to attract or keep the microfinance borrowers is larger amount of loans. With the
support from RBI which lifted the cap for individual loan amount from Rs. 50,000
to Rs. 100,000, MFIs and banks reshape their strategies accordingly to adapt to the
changing competitive environment. This will hopefully become an effective tool to
help these borrowers to eventually get in the formal banking system with stronger
25https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?id=9827
26https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/microfinance-institutions-are-struggling-for-
survival-heres-why/articleshow/60931020.cms
27https://www.livemint.com/Industry/1Jqz0fDRUpIUeYSJs8tCmK/RBI-grants-small-banks-licence-to-10-
applicants.html
28https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=10497&Mode=0
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credit record.
Chetna Sinha, the chairman of the Mann Deshi Group, shared similar views
on the future of microfinance. She mentioned in the interview that Mann Deshi
bank was established to meet the needs of the poor women who were left out by
commercial banks due to high cost. The bank implemented the Grameen model
with no more than 5 people in one group successfully over the last two decades with
a high repayment rate of nearly 100%. Now there are two major challenges the bank
is facing. One is how to localize the JLG products to take into account of the local
community and culture. This is essential when microfinance wants to penetrate into
new areas. The other is how to provide the "right" financial tools to those borrowers
who have completed several loan cycles and are ready to scale their business or get
into new business but still struggle to get into the formal banking system due to
various reasons. This group of borrowers have different requirements of cash flows
and loan amount. So new types of products should be explored to meet clients’
needs(see the box below for text of interview).
Chetna Sinha, Chairman of Mann Deshi Group
1. What made you establish Mann Deshi bank?
I was in anti emergency movement with famous Gandhian Jaiprakash
Narayan, who encouraged youth to work in India. I taught economics for
a year in Mumbai and then went with my husband to work in the rural
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community in Mhaswad. Then I found that many women could not open a
bank account even when they had money to save. The banks felt the saving
amounts were too little and the maintenance costs were too high. So my
journey started.
2. What were the challenges you faced when establishing the bank?
It was difficult to get a banking licence. It was more difficult to get a licence for
a microfinance bank. The Reserve Bank of India rejected us at the beginning
based on the fact that the women directors were illiterate. Our women were
very determined to learn so we started a 5-month intensive training on literacy
including financial literacy. I went back to the bank with 15 women and we
challenged officers from the central bank. In the end, we got the licence. We
are the first and the only all-women microfinance bank in India.
3. What is your view on the poverty trap in microfinance?
Many of our women clients are from families which are in the poverty trap.
For example, Vanita Pise, who is our current community leader and a member
of board of directors, was broke when she came to us because her husband
was in debt which the family could not repay. With the joint liability loans,
clients are able to come back to their feet and build up their credit record.
Vanita is one successful example to climb the ladder from a customer using
JLG loans to micro-entrepreneur loans in the bank. Our JLG loans repayment
rate is almost 100% due to the peer repayment model and flexible terms to
help women who are in difficult position to repay loans. Also our Foundation
program provides a lot of non-financial support such as Business school to
help women gain financial knowledge to build up their business. Our motto
is "never provide poor solutions to poor."
4. Where do you see the future of microfinance?
The JLG loans are the mainstream microfinance product which attracts lot of
investment due to its regular repayment and short tenure of loans which are
normally one year. We have been successfully implementing this product
19
in Satara district and now we are trying to explore new areas such as Mumbai
where we just established our branch this year. But we are aware of different
community and culture in the new areas. The product needs to feature those
elements which help maintain its high repayment rate. In 2010, I came across
a few vegetable vendors in the weekly market who saved with the bank but
borrowed from the money lender because of the flexibility they got from the
money lender. So we ran financial diaries to collect data and launched our
weekly market product which is a 3-year contract and the first contract’s loan
amount cannot be more than 20,000 rupees. Agents provide door-step service
to issue and collect the loan. The data shows that clients saw 20 times increase
in the capital. This is the new product we are currently running based on the
concept of JLG but incorporating the cash flow demand of clients from the
weekly market. There are challenges but also big potential. Microfinance
should not only focus on helping clients to meet with basic living standards,
it should also help women become entrepreneurs who will be the leaders in
India. Our group’s vision is to transform 1 million women entrepreneurs by
2020. Women in India should have the ownership of capital, knowledge and
technology. As a home grown bank, many of our clients have gone through the
first stage which has several loan cycles through JLG, so now they are ready
for the next stage of transformation: becoming entrepreneurs. But they still
face issues such as insufficient collateral to borrow from the formal banking
system. Entrepreneurs are different than JLG loan borrowers. They have
different cash flows. Now investors might want to hear the voice of micro-loan
entrepreneurs.
1.2.3 Why Mann Deshi?
The institutions engaged in Microfinance vary in their purpose. Some have profit
motive whereas some have developmental goals. Within institutions with develop-
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mental goals, there is further variation in the type and approach in development
that they desire and hence their purpose varies. Among these institutions, Grameen
bank from Bangladesh is the pioneer which demonstrates an applicable and success-
ful model in providing credits to the poor.
Though both Grameen and Mann Deshi operate in the same industry with de-
velopment goals, their approaches have been a bit different. From Grameen’s point
of view, women were seen as the best medium for achieving development of microfi-
nance whereas from Mann Deshi’s point of view, Microfinance was seen as the best
medium for achieving development of women. Grameen started with Microfinance
for the development of poor. They had male and female groups. Later on as fe-
male groups were significantly more efficient to maintain, they grew with female
groups. Hence, women were seen as the best medium for achieving development of
microfinance. Mann Deshi on the other hand started with financial inclusion from
a women’s development point of view. “A woman to have a greater control on her
finances” was the goal Mann Deshi wanted to achieve at the time of its inception.
This was from the point of view of women to have more liberty. More opportunity
to invest, having more assets in name and having a fair share in ownership of family
assets was seen as the ways to gain higher liberty for women. Hence, the motivation
is to have financial inclusion for women.
Mann Deshi, as the goals differences with Grameen, differs in other aspects at the
phase of inception. There are two salient points to be made. Grameen started with
lending. Lack of access to capital was identified as a reason for low productivity and
low income in poor. Mann Deshi started with savings. Lack of saving opportunity for
women was identified as the problem. Banks were not ready to accept these poor
rural women’s deposit as such small deposits were not seen viable by the banks.
Women needed access to save because they understood the benefits of having the
savings both as precautionary money and as an investment. But, not having control
on their finances they were not able to save. Quite often the men in the family would
force the women to spend the money. Many times in a life of subsistence living,
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women find themselves having lack of discipline and patience. Hence, an external
secured option to save was in demand. Mann Deshi started with an objective to
offer that. Another aspect is that Grameen had the external support in terms of
grant as a gift or as a loan until 1998, that is for more than first 20 years. The
donors included the International Fund for Agriculture and Development, the Ford
Foundation, the governments of Bangladesh and so on (Armendariz and Morduch,
2010). Mann Deshi raised the money as a capital by the rural poor women whom
they were committed to serve. It is not an investor driven institution as it is a
cooperative which means every member’s vote carries equal weight irrespective of
the investment the member has in the organisation. This limits Mann Deshi’s growth
as poor women did not have much to offer to start with.
Microfinance is seen as an untapped market opportunity. Large section of poor
population is not connected to the formal banking system. This limits the devel-
opment of poor. This untapped market is potentially also a business opportunity
for the financial institutions. There are various institutions which are engaged in
microfinance. For example, Banks, Non banking financial Companies, Cooperative
unions and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (Charitable organisations).
Certain institutions operate exclusively in Microfinance whereas others do it as part
of their overall business. Mann Deshi’s size is relatively small compared to the in-
dustry average based on 107 microfinance institutions data provided by Mix Market
as shown in Table 1.1. However, the gross loan portfolio, assets and deposits per
active borrower is higher for Mann Deshi. Also, portfolio at risk (>90 days) is 2%
for Mann Deshi whereas the figure is 3% for the industry. This is particularly im-
portant within industry which is known for low default rate while serving the “high
risk” clientele as its flagship achievement.
It is challenging to place Mann Deshi into the firm’s legal status categorized
by MIX market since Mann Deshi is a co-operative bank. When compared with
the average of two credit union/Co-operative (Annapurna Cooperative and MCM)
provided by the database, the differences narrow and some figures such as gross loan
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portfolio, assets, deposits, paid-in capital and portfolio at risk (>90 days) for Mann
Deshi are higher than the average. But when in comparison with banks, Mann Deshi
shows similar results as compared with the industry.
One possible comparable institution is Shri Mahila Sewa Cooperative (SEWA)
Bank, a sister institution of the Self Employed Women’s Association, established
in 1974. It aims at meeting the financial needs for poor women in India. “Saving-
first” is one of the philosophies of the bank. This is similar as Mann Deshi bank.
SEWA’s group loan focus is on self help group. This type of loans was the initial
product Mann Deshi provided. Along the timeline, Mann Deshi shifted to smaller
size joint liability loans and reduced SHG loans significantly. These updates in
mechanisms adapted by Mann Deshi were fitting to their own clientele as SEWA has
30% members from rural areas29 whereas the figure for Mann Deshi is 80%. Different
clientele characteristics and loan products result in different financial outcome as
shown in table 1.2. Although SEWA has larger size in the client base and higher
numbers in financial figures, the total deposits, loans and profit per member is
smaller than Mann Deshi.
Overall, the mechanisms developed and applied by the MFIs can be learnt by
other MFIs. When focusing on the mechanism, any organization is representative
regardless of its purpose and size. Mann Deshi organisation is representative because
the clientele they serve is typically the clientele faced by most MFIs. From the
chart of the trends in the rural-urban share of MFI borrowers shown in the Bharat
microfinance report 2017, the focus on rural clients by MFIs dropped from 69% to
33% from 2012 to 2015 whereas there was an increased urban clientele focus from
31% to 67% over the same period. The trend reversed during the period of 2016 to
2017. This is due to the exclusion of 6 SFBs. The shift from rural to urban clientele
makes microfinance more important in the rural areas as 80% of the poor population
in India live in rural areas 30 The poverty rate is 25% in rural areas whereas it is
29Bipasha Baruah, Women and Property in Urban India
30World https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/27/indiaspovertyprofile.
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14% in urban areas according to the figures compiled by World Bank in 2016 31.
The characteristics of clients vary in terms of income, assets, castes, occupations,
pattern of employment (wage or self employment), education, purpose of borrowing.
Mann Deshi has around 80% of its clientele from rural areas. Therefore, it gains a
greater prominence within the sector.
1.3 Mann Deshi Group
There are two organizations within the Mann Deshi Group. One is Mann Deshi
Foundation, established in 1996 to help rural women have sustainable livelihood
by providing non-financial tools. The other is Mann Deshi Mahila Bank which
was founded in 1997 to provide different financial products to women as individual
or group. The mission of the founder, Chetna Sinha is to empower women with
knowledge, skills, courage and capital access to achieve financial independence and
self-sufficiency. The new objective is to transform 1 million women entrepreneurs
by 2022.
1.3.1 Mann Deshi Foundation
The non-financial services provided by the Foundation include skills development,
mentoring and technical support to empower women entrepreneurs and their com-
munities. There are a week-long, fifteen day-long, and one-year Deshi MBA courses
on financial and adult literacy and business development which are run in 18 busi-
ness schools utilizing 8 mobile buses. The mobile buses carrying a minimum of 7
staff go to the rural areas to provide door-stop training. The 14-hour financial lit-
eracy course, offered by Mann Deshi Udyogini, is a key component to Mann Deshi
bank’s successful operations. Completing the financial literacy course is the must-do
requirement for each of Mann Deshi bank’s loan clients. The course covers topics
such as the importance of savings, timely loan repayment, and consulting the bank
whenever financial hardships become an issue. In 2017, 31,038 women attended the
31https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/27/indiaspovertyprofile
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course. Since making financial literacy compulsory for loan clients, loan default has
decreased from 4% to less than 1%. Nearly 40% of women who take the financial
literacy course started saving. Nearly 50% of them became clients of the bank32.
Apart from the Business Schools, a Chamber of Commerce (CoC) was established to
provide support for existing entrepreneurs on how to expand their businesses. The
support includes networking, mentorship and access to new market. This is a cus-
tomized financial education for women entrepreneurs to establish a sound business.
There are three CoCs serving 65,818 women by 2017. According to Figure 1.3, the
number of women involved in the business school and the Chambers of Commerce
reached 320,243 over the last five years. The financial impact on women shown
in Figure 1.4 shows positive outcome in saving activities and assets owned. Also,
Figure 1.5 shows that there is significant increase in total annual income of all bene-
ficiaries after training. The projected income for all beneficiaries in 2017 is 90 crores
compared with 73 crores in 201633.
1.3.2 Mann Deshi Mahila Bank
Mann Deshi Mahila Bank is India’s first rural financial institution to receive a co-
operative license from the Reserve Bank of India. It is a cooperative bank run by
and for women in rural Maharashtra. When there was upheaval in the microfinance
sector reshuffle since 2010, the bank was only hit in the first few months and then
retained its market share through its long-stand brand image and its close ties with
local borrowers. Also, it had limited presence in other areas where competitors had
to shut down branches. The bank is known for its groundbreaking work in the area
of financial inclusion. It has a majority of loans belonging to priority lending which
exceeds the minimum requirement of 40% by RBI. The data over the last ten years
shows that around 90% of the clients were from the "priority or weak sector" defined
by the Reserve Bank of India. 70% clients were from backward casts. 50% of bor-
rowers own small enterprises, including rope making, tailoring and dairies. The rest
32Vanita Shinde, CAO, Mann Deshi Foundation
33Mann Deshi Foundation Annual Report 2016-17
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of borrowers are street vendors or day laborers etc. It provides financial services
to over 155,000 clients. These services include loans, savings, pension, and insur-
ance, and doorstep banking which are provided by field agents who travel to clients’
doorsteps. By 2000, the bank became fully sustainable. Mann Deshi has eight
branches covering 7 districts (Satara, Solapur, Sangli, Raigarh, Ratnagiri, Pune and
Kolhapur) in Maharashtra with 10,000 transactions daily. There are in total 74
employees including 15, who work in the headquarter office34.
The bank has maintained healthy performance over the last decade. It is shown in
Figure 1.7, the bank accumulated deposit of Rs. 975,240,956 (61 percent comes from
individual deposits) by March 2018. The credit-deposit ratio maintains at around
60% which indicates strong lending activities with the core fund. The deposit and
loans/advances also have a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of more than
70%, although the annual growth rates slowed down in the last five years. It is
interesting to note that the growth rate of loan dropped to 2% in 2015 since the
bank was restricted at 10% cap on the unsecured loans which is their strongest
growth area. The bank was at the forefront in convincing RBI that higher priority
lending requires higher upper limit for unsecured loans. When RBI came up with a
circular in 2016 to allow any banks which have more than 90% priority lending to
lift the original cap on unsecured loans of 10% to 35%, Mann Deshi is the only bank
in India to fulfill the criteria. Therefore, the lending activities, especially unsecured
loans got back on the growth track. The bank believes 35% of unsecured loan will
be achieved by March 2019 after the new office setup in Mumbai this year35.
There are two kinds of unsecured loan products, JLG loans and weekly market
credit. Currently JLG loans and weekly market credit take up 20% and 13% of
total loan portfolio, respectively. The weekly market credit loan is a growing prod-
uct and reached 250,000 clients. The micro-entrepreneur loan which is one of the
secured loans reaches 30% of the loan book. In terms of loan performance, the non-
performance-asset remained stable with net ratio of two percent, which is far below
34Rekha Kulkani, CEO, Mann Deshi Bank
35Chetna Sinha, Chairman, Mann Deshi Group
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the industry average of 10%. The JLG loans with repayment rate of 99% outperform
other loan products. The capital adequacy ratio, which measures a bank’s credit
risk exposure, remains in a range between 14% to 18% which is much higher than
9% which is required by RBI for commercial banks. The bank’s net profit is 1%
due to high operating cost, especially the door-step service which is 3%. There are
in total eight types of loans. Apart from the two unsecured loans, other six secured
loans are for housing, agriculture allied, gold, vehicle loan and business loans36.
From the interviews with Rekha Kulkani, CEO of Mann Deshi Bank and Vanita
Shinde, CAO of Mann Deshi Group (see the Appendix 6.1), Mann Deshi group
is the biggest non-government institution that the poor have the access to locally.
It is more flexible than the government. The poor are identified to be lack of
opportunities to improve their own lives as an individual and from communal level.
The group supports both individual and communal development. The capital access
provided by the bank and the training provided/dams constructed by the foundation
increase the opportunities for the poor to improve their livelihood - pushing the
ceiling up. However, it is well noted that the failure to deal with the shocks can
have crushing effects on the poor who are lack of the shock management mechanism.
The group is attempting to come up with solutions such as insurance by the bank
or the cattle camp by the foundation to help the poor to survive from the shock and
minimize their loss - pulling the floor up.
With respect to the bank’s future, the CEO embraced the development of tech-
nology and acknowledged the importance of it. This is due to the competition from
both small finance banks and MFIs. In the old times, the bank was in competition
with the money lenders and now the game players are institutional players who have
better capacity to scale business. The bank has to react quickly with the help of
technology. With the introduction of ATM, mobile app and online banking, the
bank can reduce its operational costs to remain in the game. One example is the
change of agent’s remuneration schemes from commission-based to flat salary plus
36Rekha Kulkani, CEO, Mann Deshi Bank
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performance-based scheme so as to cut down the staff costs. It is also interesting
to mention that the bank is shifting its focus to more customized products such as
weekly market cash credit loans by researching the needs of customers. Also for
secured loans, the bank is trying to increase its loan amount to provide dynamic
incentives for their existing borrowers and attract new customers.
1.3.3 Mann Deshi Impact
In this section, we will look at a few stories of impact that have left a deep imprint
on the customers of Mann Deshi, which have not been highlighted in research so far.
As we know, most studies rely strictly on empirical data, but a look at these stories
reveals the nuanced way in which microfinance loans affect the poor and un-banked
clients and how the various challenges - adverse selection, moral hazard, auditing
and enforcement problems, affecting microfinance play out. To complement the
stories of the customers, the chapter contains interviews of Rekha Kulkarni, CEO,
Mann Deshi Bank, Vanita Shinde, CAO, Mann Deshi Foundation, Anil Khandare,
JLG Head of Mann Deshi Bank and Manisha Katte, Weekly Market Cash.
Stories of borrowers
Nandini Lohar
Nandini Lohar’s home doubles as her workplace, with the tools of her trade lining
the blue walls of her rickety corrugated tin house. The 29 year old woman is a mem-
ber of the Lohar caste, whose members are traditionally blacksmiths and welders.
Members of this community typically live hand to mouth, earning only a few rupees
a day, such as sharpening farm equipment and building metal fences, subject to sea-
sonal demand. There are traditionally high rates of alcoholism and abuse and low
rates of education. Nandini approached Mann Deshi Mahila Bank to microfinance
loans to finance her growing business making frames for small posters of Gondavle
Karmaraj, the local deity of Gondavle, in order to sell them to the pilgrims that visit
the temple town each year. Nandini used her initial loans to buy the raw materials,
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tools, and machines necessary for her business. Every year she travels to a neigh-
boring city to buy wood, glass, plywood, glass cutting instruments, and posters,
and returns home where she cuts them to size, and nails them together into frames.
Her husband operates the larger plywood cutting machine they bought with one of
her loans. Nandini has invested extensively in the infrastructure for her business
over the last few years, slowly building her capacity to meet her long term visions of
expansion. Nandini and her husband are extraordinary in the entrepreneurial vision
they brought to the decision to convert their existing skills to make something new
and market worthy. Her slow but steady upward mobility has isolated her from her
caste, but she believes it has shown her a better alternative. She has surrounded
herself with a community that values education and discourages drinking, and she
intends to instill those same values in her young children.
Vaishali Pise
Vaishali Anile Pise got married at age 17. Soon after, her husband was driven out
of his family business due to family feud. This left them in a dire situation with no
source of income. With no formal education or skills under her belt, Vaishnavi was
forced to work as an agricultural wage labourer and fended for herself. But with
the birth of her first son, Vaishali wanted to find another source of income. She
decided to start her own Vada Pav (street food consisting of bread and vegetable
gravy) stall. With the little money she was able to save, she set up her stall beside
an auto stand. With her new born baby on her hip, she would sell Vada Pav earning
profit of just Rs. 40 per day. Eager to expand her business, she decided to move her
stall outside of her relative’s hotel. She was able to borrow the hotel’s equipment at
night, only after they had used it, to make her Vada Pav. Only selling her Vada Pav
at night, Vaishali knew she could earn more if she had her own equipment. This is
when Vaishali approached the Mann Deshi Bank for a loan of Rs.5,000. She used
this money to purchase her own cooking equipment. Now she was able to make
and sell Vada Pav all day, without the need to depend on any one. Naturally, her
income grew from Rs.40 a day to Rs.70. Encouraged by this, Vaishali enrolled into
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the Mann Deshi business School to learn how to run her business more effectively.
She listened to Mann Deshi Radio for business tips. She learnt that by listening to
her customers and understanding their needs would make her successful. When her
customers enquired for mineral water, she decided to take another loan of Rs.10,000
to purchase and sell mineral water. This loan allowed her to expand into a wider
variety of other food items like tea, rice and dal, and baked goods. She built a shed
to store and protect her raw materials. Today Vaishali earns a Rs.1,500 a day and
can save Rs. 5,000 per month. She is the major bread winner in her family and
manages to send her children to school. She hopes to run her own restaurant one
day. Vaishali’s inspiring story is what helped her become a recipient of the 2017
Successful Entrepreneurship Award from Mann Deshi.
Vanita Pise
Vanita Pise is a typical story of a Mann Deshi woman entrepreneur, yet she is unique
in her journey. She has organised over 500 women into self-help groups and assisted
many of them set up their own enterprises and become financially independent.
Vanita now runs Mann Deshi’s newest programme; the Farm to Market project,
which organizes small and marginal farmers, aggregates their produce and supports
them access markets directly. Vanita was born in a respectable middle class family
and was married at the age of 18, when she had just completed her 9th standard
of schooling. Her husband’s family was prosperous and ran a poultry farm, or so
she assumed. The mirage of plenty shattered when Vanita’s husband brought her
to his poultry barn. She assumed he wanted to show her his wealth; he assumed she
would clean the shed three times a day. As the unhappy years of increasing poverty,
debt, and hard physical labor wore on, she tried to hide her roughened hands from
her parents and sisters, but instead became the object of her family’s pity. In 1997
her husband’s poultry business finally collapsed, leaving him in debt. Vanita then
applied for loan from Mann Deshi Mahila Bank. She began rearing buffaloes and
goats while selling their milk from house to house. With Mann Deshi she discovered
an opportunity to be part of and build Self Help Groups of women, which became
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her source of excitement and joy. As she narrates, “When I was moving around
in the villages to organize women, I saw that they were giving me respect for the
first time and after a lifetime of frustration and pity this was a welcome change.”
Despite her natural charisma and charm, it still was not easy for Vanita to start
the SHGs. In order to be part of an SHG, all members must save; Vanita was
unable to do so herself because she was supporting her 18- person extended family.
Ever resourceful, she taught herself to stitch by candle-light and began a tailoring
business on the side, the earnings from which went directly into her savings account
with the SHG and Bank. In starting the SHGs, Vanita also had to overcome her
deep-rooted fear of taking a loan and falling further into debt. Despite her poverty
and Backward Caste, Vanita came from a middle class family, and had to build
relationships with lower-class women and gain their trust, while ignoring her hus-
band’s family’s continual efforts to subvert her work. Her eyes sparkle as she says,
“Whenever you work with women, the most important factor is how you develop
the trust and confidence.” Vanita has organized 35 SHGs and began organizing the
women in her SHGs to buy goats and buffalo for their own milk-vending businesses.
In 2004 Vanita decided to take a 15,000 rupee ($375) loan for a machine to make
paper cups for prasad or prayer offerings. She bought the raw material and made
and sold 5,000 cups each day. When she realized how successful her business was,
she started a dealership of the machines so other women could also profit. Through
this initiative, Vanita has facilitated 17 women in the purchasing of their own ma-
chines. Vanita serves as the co-guarantor on a loan that each woman takes from
Mann Deshi Mahila Bank for a machine. Then she brings the raw material to the
women and collects and markets their final product for sale. Each woman makes
5,000 cups each day, and earns an income of 2,500 rupees ($63) per month, thanks
to Vanita’s entrepreneurship. Vanita herself earns an income of 3,000 rupees ($75)
per month. She also earns income from her buffalo, goats, tailoring, and land.
In April 2006 she was declared one of two national winners of the Woman Exem-
plar Award, sponsored annually by the National Confederation of Indian Industries.
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She received the award at Delhi from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The Ex-
emplar Award is designed to honor “grass-roots, poor, under privileged community
level women who have excelled in their contribution in the development process and
empower others”. She had been doing exactly this for years.
Nilofar Wahida Patwekar
Nilofar used to help her mother who stitched Saree blouses for neighbourhood
women. After being married off just after finishing her class 10th, she came to
live in Pachwad, Satara. While her husband runs a chicken shop, she runs her own
tailoring shop and tailoring class. She took a loan of Rs 20 Thousands from Mann
Deshi Mahila Bank, five years back. She was part of a JLG group of five women.
The same group subsists now. From her first loan, she purchased two to three tai-
loring machines and spent also on materials such as lining, buttons etc. She daily
cuts up to 20 blouses and gets them stitched from her workers. She employees three
full time workers. She has a turnover of around 15 thousand rupees in a fortnight.
Nilofar took a loan of Rs40 thousand last December from Mann Deshi. This is the
biggest loan amount that Mann Deshi can offer to a single borrower, without col-
lateral. But her need was far more. Hence she took another loan from Bandhan, an
MFI, which was of Rs120 thousand. She finds it hard and cumbersome to deal with
two loans at the same time and to manage the loan installments every week at two
places. She stated in her interview that it would be best if she could get a larger
loan from Mann Deshi itself which is currently not possible. This will also create a
better credit rating as she will be dealing with a bank rather than a money lender
or an NBFC. However, current RBI policy does not allow Mann Deshi bank to offer
a non collateral loan of greater than Rs40 thousand. Nilofar feels she is constrained
by the slow credit availability.
Reflection
The first thing that we see from these three stories is the obvious fact that they are
all entrepreneurial women who have overcome immense structural challenges thrown
at them in life - from crushing poverty to cruel patriarchy from lack of capital to
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denial of family support. Women are not allowed to fail in patriarchy; if they fail
in one venture, it becomes impossible for them to ever take on another. Hence they
work endlessly to ensure success. That is a reason also why their credit return is so
high to their bank- Mann Deshi has very low default rate.
These women’s enterprise shows a multiplier effect- when they learn something
they bring in others and expand the scope of operations. We see from Vanita Pise
that she is an entrepreneur and provides leadership through example. Nandini Lohar
is now living unlike others in her community, who have a hand to mouth existence
and their family life is rife with alcoholism and domestic violence. And Vaishali Pise
is running a busy tea shop in a street corner crowded by men- flouting notions of
female modesty by confidently conducting business in the public zone. The women
of Mann Deshi have surpassed their chains by their grit.
Mann Deshi’s borrowers still have more potential than their bank and the sector
is able to tap. They have low default rate. So their credit rating is proven to be
high. Yet Mann Deshi is not allowed to give these women higher loans without
collateral. Nilofar is a case in point. It was found that in other two cases - namely
Vaijayanta Kakde from Lonand, who runs a grocery shop and Vijaya Pise, who is a
farmer in Piliv who had taken loan for purchase of diary animals - similar problems
arose. Despite returning the previous loans on time and successfully managing their
current loan repayment instalments, they are unable to get bigger loans from Mann
Deshi. Therefore they have been compelled to take out loans from money lenders
or other micro-finance institutions. The fact that they manage the instalments of
multiple loans at the same time is a testimony of their creditworthiness. They all
claim that it would be easier and beneficial in the long run to get all credit from
one institution which is their women’s bank.
Impact studies
In 2006, the bank assessed 60 clients in four branches to evaluate the economic and
social impact on them. 75% of the respondents enjoyed an increase in income after
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taking the loans from the bank. The investment of extra income went to the health
and education of the family. For example, meal quality which is part of livelihood
improved significantly by eliminating the poor section of 26% before being clients
of the bank. One third of the clients in the sample positioned themselves higher in
the community (Mann Deshi impact studies 2006).
The study done by Deutsche Geselischaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ) GmbH in 2015 attempted to evaluate the impact of two loan products, a term
loan(TL) and a cash credit loan (CCL) by using a randomized controlled approach
over one year period from 2014 to 2015. There are in total 360 market vendors in
the sample to form groups of 3 for the loans. 31% of CCL clients, comparing with
2% of TL clients had a large increase in profits. Also the daily average sales was
23% higher for CCL clients than for TL clients. This could be attributed to better
quality of goods with higher profit margin for CCL clients. It seems that CCL
clients utilize the loans well with 68% of clients reaching the maximum withdrawal
amount. It is worth noting that vendors’ personal consumption increased by 20%
in the CCL group.
Another study in 2016 focusing on the impact of the one-year Deshi MBA busi-
ness programme, launched in 2015 by Mann Deshi Foundation, was conducted by
Grameen Foundation India to evaluate the impact of the programme on 286 par-
ticipants. The participants have to meet the requirements of a minimum two-year
business experience and a minimum turnover of $3,000. The results suggest that
the programme enhanced women’s confidence to run good business by providing
not only a platform to learn how to expand the business and tools to utilize in the
business but also creating a social business circle. The business performance im-
proved with an increase in profit margin from 19.9% (baseline) to 22.3% (endline).
Furthermore, more women (10% higher during endline compared with the baseline)
have experience of saving products at banks. 61% of them have saving account with
Mann Deshi bank. In terms of credit experience, 36% of the participants borrowed
a loan over the last one year and 94% of them are from banks. Also, the loan
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application rejections reduced by two thirds in the endline survey compared with
the baseline survey. This is an encouraging sign for the financial inclusion with the
support of financial training programmes.
1.4 Joint Liability Loan Products
Mann Deshi Bank has two joint liability loan products, namely, joint liability group
loans (JLGs) launched in 2010 and weekly market cash credit loans(CCLs) launched
in 2014.They are both unsecured loans which the bank has a special quota of 35%
cap in terms of the proportion in the loan portfolio from RBI.
1.4.1 Joint Liability Group Loans (JLG Loans)
The original JLG loans the bank issued were for self help groups with more than
20 members. Loans were taken by a group leader on behalf of the group and then
loans were distributed with the agreement among team members. The CEO of the
bank mentioned in the interview that due to large size, discretionary loan use and
dispersed geographical residence of group members, it is difficult for the bank to have
sufficient control of the performance of loans. Therefore, JLG loans for smaller group
(maximum 5 members) with weekly repayment schedule were launched in 2011 and
with monthly repayment schedule launched in 2013. Mann Deshi Mahila Bank’s
business processes currently operate on two distinct levels as shown in Figure 1.8:
the field and the office. The office is further divided between branch offices and the
head office. JLG Loan agents carry out all operations in the field. These operations
include travelling to clients’ doorsteps, collect deposits and loan repayments, and
travelling to the appropriate branch office each day to transfer data. Each branch
office is responsible for opening loan and savings accounts, depositing the collected
funds, distributing loans and matured savings, and transferring all data into the
system. Loan officers will evaluate the information collected by the agent and make
a decision on the loan application. The information of JLG loans will be sent to
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both JLG product head and branch managers. The JLG product head and each
branch reports this data to the general manager who will report to the CEO of the
bank. Once it is reviewed, it will be compiled into a report submitted to the Reserve
Bank of India for monitoring.
JLG loans experienced an impressive growth over the years. This product consists
of 28% of loan portfolio in 2018. The compound annual growth rate of JLG loans
in terms of loan amount is 114% during the period from 2011 to 2015. This is
largely due to the significant growth rate in the first three years after the product
is launched. The loan groups increased from 74 in 2011 to 1,189 in 2015. The loan
cycle now reached the fifth round.
Borrowers’ description
Over the period of 2011 to 2015, we have digitized 4,914 first JLG loan application
forms. A third of the borrowers are in their 30s and the other one third of borrowers
are in their 40s. As shown in Figure 1.9, more than half (54.35%)of the borrowers
are self-employed as tailors, street vendors of fruits and vegetables, bakers, cobblers
and so on. One out of three (34.35%) borrowers work as wage labour. A majority
of them are farm hand or builders. Only 6.88% of the borrowers are in salary jobs
whereas 4.42% of women have household duties. 75% of the borrowers have a family
size between 3 to 5. 82% of co-applicants are husbands whereas 12% of co-applicants
are sons. Out of five borrowers, two come from a household with monthly income
ranging from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 15,000, one comes from the income range from Rs.
5,000 to Rs10, 000 and another from Rs15,000 to Rs.20,000, respectively. Nearly
90% of borrowers contribute less than half to the family income.
Figure 1.10 and Figure 1.11 summarize the distributions of occupation and caste
category. The forward caste clients happen to be 20%, out of which 16% point is
Maratha, which is the most populated caste in the region. 31% of borrowers are
from schedule caste which were traditionally considered "untouchables". 10.48% are
from Mahar and 10.07% are from Matang. As per the national definition of Other
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Backward Caste (OBC), 43% of the borrowers are in this category. Among 48
castes in OBC category, 7.59% are Ramoshi and 4.93% are Mali. Vadar, Dhangar,
Lohar, Nhavi and Wani are represented in descending order from four to two percent.
12.58% are Muslims, which is the largest religious minority in the region. This shows
that the borrowers are well diversified in the caste and communities. Moreover,
traditionally under-represented communities from the formal banking sector happen
to be well represented in Mann Deshi bank.
Borrowers are checked if they own any cattle or goat. These could be seen as
important assets in the rural economy. It is a sign of wealth as well as potential
income. 30% of the borrowers own either of these animals. Only 2% of the borrowers
own a bull. This might be because most of borrowers do not have land or machines
are increasingly replacing the traditional farming methods using bulls for transport
and ploughing. 12% of the borrowers own a buffalo and 15% of the borrowers own
a cow. It is worth noting that only two out of three borrowers who have either
buffaloes or cows owns only one. This shows the significance of the value of the
buffaloes. On the other hand, productivity is restricted by the lack of access to
capital to scale it. One out of five borrowers own a goat. One out of 40 borrowers
owns a herd bigger than ten goats and half of them only owns one goat. Goats
require less investment and infrastructure and they can provide milk for household,
which could be important for children nutrition. Also, they can be insurance for the
family against any shock.
67% of the borrowers have only one phone and 28% of them have more than two
phones which can be due to a bigger family size. This technology is well penetrating
in the rural areas and among the poor population. With respect to white goods,
84% of the borrowers have a TV and and 29% have a fridge. 70% of the borrowers
have at least one cylinders. For vehicles, 61% of the borrowers do not have bikes
and 52% of the borrowers do not have two wheeler. For land, 68% of borrowers do
not have land. 82% of the borrowers own the properties they stay and the rest of
them are in rental. More than half of the borrowers live in a brick-wall house with
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roof made of sheet. Out of four borrowers, one lives in a house with a single room
and two live in a house with two rooms.
For the purpose of loans illustrated in Figure 1.12, 54% of the borrowers have
taken loans to buy an animal. Among these borrowers, more than two third of
borrowers do not have prior experience in this activity. One out of three have got
loans for business. Half of these borrowers did not report having any experience in
business. This suggests an expansion of entrepreneurship.
Analysis of loans
From Table 1.3 , we can observe that May 2011 to January 2016, there are in total
17,700 loans. 12,219 (69%) of them are by the borrowers who have borrowed from
the bank for the first time. Out of these, 7,525 borrowers (62% of first time loans)
have yet to repay at the end of the window period. These are live accounts since the
end date of the repayment is beyond the window period. Among 4,694 borrowers
who have repaid their first loans, 80% (3,732) got into the second loan before the
end of the window period. The rest of the borrowers who did not get into the second
loan yet may or may not have applied for the loans beyond the window period. 1,706
(nearly half of the second loans) borrowers have completed the second loan cycle.
There are in total 1,500 borrowers who borrowed for the third time. Considering
the duration of the loan is at least one year and the window period is less than
five years, not many loans have completed this loan cycle. Only 18% of borrowers
have completed and out of which 89% went into the fourth loan. There are only
13 loans in the fifth loan cycle. They are all live. This table shows majority of
borrowers are the first time borrowers which indicates the strong growth of this
product. Furthermore, many borrowers get to the next round of borrowing which
shows borrowers have dynamic incentives to repay well. From Table 1.4, as the
borrowers get the next loan, the amount of loans they received successively goes on
increasing. The second loan is 56% larger in amount than the first. There is a cap
of Rs40,000 for unsecured loan to an individual offered by a bank as per RBI rules,
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hence, the change increase goes on diminishing.
We consider period from 2011 to 2015 to look at loan amount disbursed and
repayment frequency. It is shown in table 1.5 that in 2011 when the JLG loans were
launched with weekly repayment schedule, all of loans started at Rs10,000 except
less than 10% starting at Rs15,000. As it gained momentum, in 2012, the number of
new loans increased nearly six fold with a proportion of loans starting at Rs10,000
remaining unchanged. In 2013, the first loans of amount value of Rs20,000 were
disbursed, consisting of one third of the total first loans for the year. Proportion of
Rs20,000 first loans kept increasing and it reached 93% of total first loans in 2015.
The shift to disburse the first loans at Rs20,000 can be attributed to the following
factors. The bank has confidence in identifying more reliable clients and is mature
in monitoring system to retain the high repayment rate. The inflation rate during
2011 to 2015 was above 5% and 2011 even reached two digits. Considering this, RBI
also doubled the cap of unsecured loans soon after the end of the window period.
As the bank opened its Dhayari branch in the suburb of the busy metropoli-
tan city of Pune in 2013, the monthly repayment scheme was launched considering
the monthly cash flow cycles observed in the urban areas. 36% of the loans are
monthly cycle loans. The growth of this product comes from the establishment of
new branches which seek new borrowers in new areas and existing branches expand-
ing their geographical areas of operation.
Most of the loans with weekly repayment schedule have duration of one year
(49%) and one and half years (46%). A major proportion of loans (89%) with
monthly repayment schedule have a duration of two years. It is worth mentioning
that nearly 80% of borrowers took 40 days to start the next loan. This further
strengthens the growth of the product.
The JLG loan proves its success with nearly 100% repayment rate. This mature
loan model can give the bank spare time to focus on other aspects of the product
such as how to reduce the wage bill or provide better dynamic incentives. The
bank shifted from commission-based package to flat salary plus performance-related
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bonus package to agents in 2013 so as to reduce the staff cost without affecting the
staff performance. Also the bank is in the discussion of having higher individual
loan amount to attract existing or new clients.
JLG loans continue its journey with a diverse customer base from both rural and
urban areas. In recent years, there seem to be increasing challenges from competi-
tors. For example, NBFCs which are not supervised by RBI have more flexibility in
adjusting loan specification such as loan amount.The JLG head of Mann Deshi bank
suggested that the future of maintaining the customers is to introduce an individual
loan with higher amount which can become a strong incentive for borrowers.
1.4.2 Weekly Market Cash Credit Loans (CCLs)
Mann Deshi bank has been seeking a new product under the unsecured loan category
so as to diversify its portfolio. It shifted its attention to the weekly market which
is considered by villagers as a big event. According to Kashyap and Raut (2010),
there are about 47,000 weekly markets which engage 50% of the population in India.
The market is a place where village people come to buy/sell products and interact
with their friends or relatives. Local or non-local products ranging from agricultural
goods to industrial goods are presented in the market. Vendors either sell self-
grown/made products or buy agricultural goods from farmers/wholesalers to sell.
The profit margin can be up to 30% (Mann Deshi Foundation). The bank was
aware of the demand of working capital for vendors to purchase goods, especially
the benefits of buying goods as a cash buyer.
In 2012 the bank collected data of daily cash flows of Mann Deshi’s clients and
potential clients to understand vendors’ cash needs. The activity on particular day
of every week could be observed to be very high. This day being the weekly market
day for the town where the person lived. This once again underlined the significance
of weekly market in economic lives of the rural poor. Mann Deshi noticed the need
of credit by vendors including farmers and traders who do not have sufficient access
or no access to formal financial tools in the banking system in the weekly markets.
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Vendors tend to use money lenders to fulfill their cash needs, even the interest rate
can be up to 10% daily. Also, they found borrowing from the bank would be too
time consuming due to the complicated procedures.
A follow-up preliminary study was conducted in 2013 to see if it can fill in the
gap by providing a door-step financial product which would meet the unpredictable
cash needs for the clients without collateral. They targeted 4 towns - Dahiwadi,
Gondavale, Mhaswad and Piliv to collect data through interviewing 134 randomly
selected vendors weekly for one year. There were in total 3,689 data points collected.
The sample has traders, farmers and vendors. 77% of vendors involved in selling
vegetables or fruits. The study justified the market gap observed by the bank. First
of all, wholesalers normally give credit up to 1.4% daily interest rate to vendors. The
quality of goods is poorer for vendors on credit than the vendors on cash due to lower
negotiation power for vendors on credit. Second, the working capital of a vendor
varies but there is a perpetual demand. The range of capital need is from 0 to Rs.
100,000. Finally, the profit margins for vendors were high, which allowed vendors to
be able to recover when bad days came. During the same period of collecting data,
the bank launched a pilot Cash Credit Loan (CCL) product in Satara and Mhaswad,
which proved to successfully address the market failure to connect vendors to the
formal financial system.
In 2014, the bank officially launched Weekly Market Cash Credit Loans (CCLs)
to meet the demand of cash flows by vendors and cope with the risk of variability of
sales and profit and the perishable characteristics of the trading goods. The CCLs
are for groups of three women doing business in the same market with at least 2
years of experience as retailers. It is another kind of joint liability group products
offered by the bank. The drawing limit ranges from INR10,000 to INR40,000 with
an interest rate of 24% per annum. The minimum weekly repayment is 10% of the
total drawing power and the minimum interest is 0.5%. The CCLs are serviced by
Field Serve Agents (FSAs). The majority of agents are paid on commission. Before
2015, the commission rate is 20% of their interest revenue or 4.8% of the agent’s
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loan portfolio. After the structural change of salary scheme in 2013, agents are
paid with a flat fee plus variable compensation.3 to 4 weekly markets are assigned
to every FSA. Each FSA manages around 170 clients. By 2017, there are 10,000
clients from 48 markets in 150 villages of Satara, Pune and Solapur district. The
loan amount was Rs20,628,335 by November, 2018. This is 3% of the loan portfolio.
The net profit of this product maintains at 5% but the current repayment rate
for this product is 95% which is significantly less than JLG loans. The head of
weekly market cash credit loans mentioned that this is due to the complication of
geographical location of clients and the feature of weekly market which makes it
more difficult for the agent to track down the repayment. The bank recognized the
challenges of this new type of joint liability loans and is on the way to develop a
better system in screening and monitoring by utilizing the experience learned from
JLG loans.For example, the maximum number of group increased from three to five.
CCL is an innovative product which provides access to credit for working capital
purpose targeting the poor who do not have collateral for loans. Big banks offer
similar overdraft products to businesses to boost their working capital which is risky
in nature. Charging borrowers only at the credit needed at the point takes away
the risk from the business. Hence, it is a costly loan for a borrower. However, CCLs
are for the poor so the ticket size is small and more controllable from the MFIs’
point of view. So only MFIs can offer this type of product which is resource-intense
especially more monitoring is required.
1.4.3 JLGLs vs.CCLs
Mann Deshi’s JLG loan is a term loan which targets a group of 4 to 7 people. The
amount of loans is fixed by bank in a range from 10,000 to 40,000 rupees. And a
lump sum is distributed to borrowers at the beginning of the loan term. The tenure
is normally from one to two years. Interest rate is 26% Borrowers are expected to
pay an equal and fixed amount of weekly or monthly instalments over the period.
This product has shown a consistent record of high repayment rate, however it
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may not closely match with the cash needs of all potential borrowers, especially
entrepreneurs whose demand for cash is more uncertain and fluctuating. Therefore,
Mann Deshi initiated the weekly market cash credit product which was designed for
business women in the local weekly market. This product is an overdraft facility
therefore the amount of loans issued and instalment depends on borrowers’ liquidity
at the time. This gives borrowers more control on their cash demand to match with
the business. As shown in the table 1.6, similar credit limit and interest rate are
available for borrowers but the size of group is smaller and only weekly repayment
is provided. This product currently has lower repayment rate than JLG loans. This
is largely due to the feature of the weekly market where borrowers run business at.
From the interviews with Anil Khandare, Head of JLG loans and Manisha Katte,
Head of weekly market cash credit loans in Appendix 6.1, both joint liability loan
products were developed to fill in the market gap. JLG loans address the needs
of rural women who do not have banking infrastructure near home or incur higher
cost to use the banking services whereas the weekly market cash credit considers
the cash flow of vendors in the weekly market. Although the weekly market cash
credit loan is still in its initial stage, it has potential as the bank does not only have
experience from implementing the JLG loans to learn from but also there is a strong
market demand. When running these products, the bank was able to come up with
different strategies to deal with the challenges. For example, the bank recognized
the reasons why borrowers default and improved its customer screening process to
avoid such defaults. When borrowers could not repay loans, the bank was ready
to offer flexible repayment scheme (such as paying only interest or extending the
repayment period) just like Grameen bank’s model to keep the clients on track.
Also, repayment frequency for JLG loans started with weekly but added monthly
when the bank went into urban areas. The number of group members allowed also
changed according to the loan performance. JLG loans started with up to ten people
and then identified the effective number of group as five. But the bank tends to keep
certain flexibility to enlarge its client base. So it allows more than five in one group
43
if the group has a good repayment record. The weekly market cash credit loans
started with three people in one group. But the bank observed the heavy burden
for group members to pay off others’ share. Hence the bank increased the group
number to five at maximum. These changes in strategies provide strong evidence
for how the bank is gaining its experience and competitiveness through trial and
error with flexibility to deal with issues. They also show the adaptation of the bank
reacting to the complication over different periods of time.
1.5 Conclusion
The last two decades witnessed the journey of Mann Deshi bank for its outreach
to the poor women in rural Maharashtra. Due to the restriction on the unsecured
loans by RBI to maintain a diverse portfolio, the bank can have 35% of loan port-
folio belonging to unsecured loans after the special order from RBI.This target will
be fulfilled in early 2018 according to the CEO of the bank. The JLG loans are
the flagship products with outstanding repayment rates of 99%. Although the de-
velopment of microfinance sector is like a roller-coaster, Mann Deshi Bank keeps
expanding its share in JLG loans with a diverse client base. Also the bank has a
deep understanding on customers’ cash needs. One innovative product to reflect
this is the weekly market credit product to serve the credit needs for vendors in
the weekly markets. This is a growing product although it is currently facing some
challenges such as repayment collection and social tie between group members. This
product can potentially become another flagship microfinance loan product which
is closely linked with customers’ cash requirement over the period.
Now the management team is seeking for more growth areas apart from devel-
oping the weekly market credit loans. The mission of connecting the poor to have
access to credit has a mature model and getting close to its full capacity in certain
regions. Apart from exploring new regions with the awareness of localization of the
product, the management team starts to look for other opportunities to keep those
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clients who do not have collateral but have completed a few loan cycles in the un-
secured loans with good credit record. Therefore, the bank’s mission now is shifted
from group lending to micro-entrepreneur lending which has lower cost of borrow-
ing (18%). Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) contributed 28.77% of
GDP in India in 2015 with 51% from the rural sector. The female ownership in the
rural MSMEs is only 20%. In terms of the size of enterprises, female distribution in
micro-, small- and medium size enterprises are 20%, 5% and 3% (Ministry of Micro,
Small and Medium Enterprises,2017). This shows the size of market which Mann
Deshi Bank can potentially benefit from with their new strategy. The Mann Deshi
Foundation already started the programs to set up a business community to help
entrepreneurs to scale their business. There are a few challenges the bank is facing.
One is the capital. Being a co-operative bank, there is limited use of capital to
expand their loan portfolio. Second, even the bank’s strength is in unsecured loans,
there is a cap by RBI to restrict its momentum. Finally, the secured loans to indi-
viduals will be exposed to the competition with other commercial banks or public
sector banks which have advantages in cost of fund. For the bank to continue the
journey further, the following questions remain on the agenda: are the borrowers’
needs being met? Are they able to get into the formal banking sector? If not, can
microfinance adapt to their needs? Also is there a substantial change in the type of
needs that they have?
Microfinance institutions’ success depends on their ability to commit to the con-
tinuous process of identifying the financial and ancillary business needs of the poor,
innovative engineering the impeccable solution and scaling to its full potential. On
the one hand, to identify the needs and to provide the solution, an MFI needs to
be flexible. On the other hand, standardisation with great precision and strict dis-
cipline would allow an MFI to penetrate the currently costly markets. How well the
balance is achieved by MFIs will decide the future of microfinance.
Although microfinance attracts world-wide attention and has been growing quickly,
especially in developing countries, many unresolved issues still remain. Does mi-
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crofinance actually reach the very poor? This issue of “mission drift” was well
documented by Hulme (2000) and Zeller et al., (2011). For example, Duvendack
(2010) examines the microfinance programme of Self Employed Women’s Associ-
ation (SEWA) in India and argues that microfinance may only benefit “a slightly
better off group”. The paper also addresses that the impact of microfinance claimed
by other studies might be because of the differences in the borrowers’ characteris-
tics. The reasons that microfinance cannot reach the poorest of the poor can be the
difficulty in being accepted in a group (Hulme and Mosley, 1996) or the structure of
the products such as saving before borrowing (Mosley, 2001). Furthermore, micro-
finance is a resource-intense industry which requires lots of funding. There is a gap
between the supply and demand in microfinance. According to the president and
CEO of the Grameen Foundation 37, MFIs supplied around $15 to $25 billion loans
while microfinance service required funding around $300 billion in 2008. Some MFIs
raise funds from equity or bond markets whereas majority of them receive funds from
donation or banking sector (Bystrom, 2008). Although there is a strong need for the
commercialization of microfinance, it might cause “mission drift” due to investors’
expectation of profits (Bateman 2010). Whether the mission of microfinance can be
retained with profit-driven motive is still to be answered.
37https://ssir.org/images/articles/2008SU_feature_Counts.pdf
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Interviews in September 2018
Rekha Kulkani, CEO of Mann Deshi Bank
1. What is the strategy of loan portfolio in the next 5 years?
Portfolio of loans above 5 lakh are 43%. In future we want to decrease this percentage
and give more loans below 5 lakhs. One more good thing, unsecured loan is 40,000
per person right now. Proposal has been given to RBI to increase it to 1.5 lakhs.
We think they will increase it. What that means is that clients who have taken
multiple loans from various banks can take only one loan from Mann Deshi.
2. What is the current development of technology in the bank?
We are launching online Banking soon. Plus ATM is also being set up in 4 branches
-Satara, Mhaswad, Dhayari and Kamothe. Mobile app costs 12 lakhs so far (exclud-
ing monthly recurring) and one ATM card costs 300 rupees. Technology seems to
become more and more important in our business model.
3. What challenges did the bank face with the products before JLG
loans?
We started with self help group loans with bigger numbers of group members. But
the borrowers tend to spread in a wider range of geographical locations which causes
problems in monitoring and repayment collection. For JLG loans, clients are con-
centrated. Also they are smaller in size so there is a higher level of peer pressure
which leads to higher repayment rate and better monitoring. JLG loans now are
mature products which do not have issues in implementation, product design and
staffing. We maintain a good pool of agents who facilitate loans and locate new
clients. When we launched the product at the beginning, all agents were paid by
commission which created high cost for the bank. So we decided to change the
salary scheme to a flat fee plus commission based on a matrix. This change reduced
our paycheck but did not affect agents’ performance.
4. What are the challenges for the weekly market credit product?
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The current repayment rate of the product is 95% which is starkly lower when
comparing with the repayment rate of 99% for JLG loans. Though this is also a
door-step service, it is not to the residence but the place of business which does not
have any permanent settlement. The client does business in a weekly market. She
only turn up on that particular market day in one market. Her schedule of visiting
different markets is normally fixed. If she changes her schedule, an agent will put
more effort to track her down to her residence. Her co-borrowers interaction with
her might also be limited to that particular market in a weekly basis. Hence the
expected transaction cost for the co-borrowers and the cost of enforcement for the
agent increases.
5. Who are your competitors and how do you differentiate Mann Deshi
Bank from them?
NBFCs are one of our competitors. However, they don’t have saving products
and their presence in our area is limited. We provide technical support to our
clients through our business programs in our foundation. After the demonetization,
many NBFCs face collection problems and suspend new disbursement. Another
competitors are small finance banks (SFBs). Quite a few of them used to be NBFC-
MFIs. RBI showed a tendency to support such kind of shift in recent years by
issuing more SFB licences. SFBs are still at the initial stage to compete with us
since the infrastructure such as branches would require more establishment.
Vanita Shinde, CAO of Mann Deshi Foundation
1. What made you start the Business school for rural women?
A few years back, many women came to us and asked us to train them how to use
certain things such as a phone. And then they asked if we can provide basic training
for them to upgrade their business skills. That is how the Business school started.
Once those women are confident and more experienced, they request for support to
help them break into the new market to get more money. So we started Chambers
of Commerce and Deshi MBA.
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2. How successful are the programs? Any measurement?
We have been doing survey annually to collect data from our beneficiaries so that
we can get a better picture of the impact our programs bring to the community.
The results are quite promising. For example, the figure of the percentage of women
who started saving after the Business school program increased from 38% in 2012
to 42% in 2016. The total annual income of all beneficiaries after training increased
from 42 crores to 73 crores in 2016.
3. Do you face any challenges in promoting those programs?
Originally we had on-site Business schools which required women or girls to come
for the training. Then we realized that many women or girls live further away and
so could not come for the training. We started to launch mobile business schools
on buses which will take trainers to different villages to provide door-step training.
This proved to be very popular and attracts more young girls. In terms of the
community development, we promoted water conservation projects to build dams
for local community. This is because a majority of the women we work within
Satara belong to farming communities in Mann Taluka of Satara district, which is
one of the most drought prone areas of rural Maharashtra. This area receives four to
five inches of rain a year. Many of whom traditionally belong to the local shepherd
community, are forced to migrate hundreds of kilometers in search of work in the dry
season. Migration causes many problems including health, nutrition and education
of children. Women came to us for help. By 2017, we have 3 check dams built and
102 wells rejuvenated. New businesses such as fisheries emerged together with the
stability of traditional farming increased farmers’ incomes by two times. During the
drough time in 2012, we also started the cattle camp which is open to public for
feeding their animals with water for free. More than 50,000 animals came to the
camp from more than 52 villages.
Anil Khandare, Head of JLG loans, Mann Deshi Bank
1. Why did you come up with the JLG loans?
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We identified three main issues for rural women. One is that they do not have
frequent connection with urban areas where more financial access is concentrated.
Also, the cost is too high for these women to come to town to get or repay loans.
The last thing is about the paperwork required for loans. Therefore, we launched
the JLG loans which have joint liabilities as collateral and provide door-step service
to ensure the repayment of loans. We started with a group of up to 10 members
and then we reduced to five. Now we allow the well-performing groups to increase
the group size.
2. What were the challenges you faced in JLG loans?
Over the period, we did not have any significant challenges for JLG loans. This
product has a repayment rate of 99%. During demonetization, NBFCs experienced
repayment issues since they did not accept big notes. But our bank still accepted
big notes, so JLG loans did not get affected much.
3. Who are the main competitors in JLG loans? How would Mann
Deshi deal with the competition?
The competition is greater than it used to be. Especially NBFCs in recent years
become more aggressive in JLG loans. Since they are not banks and not under
the supervision of RBI, their lending is less stringent. For example, they will issue
loans to clients who have two or three loans in other institutions whereas we don’t
issue loans to such clients. Also, their JLG loan amount starts at Rs30,000/40,000
while our product starts at Rs20,000 for the first time borrowers. To adapt with the
competition, we also sanction loans to first-time borrowers at Rs30,000 if they have
good credit record. Our customers will also have more initial cost to take the loan
since we are a co-operative bank. Customers need to buy shares to become members
who can take loans. But customers also understand banks are under supervision of
RBI and would be more reliable.
4. What are the common reasons for the defaults of JLG borrowers?
How does the bank deal with it? How effective are these approaches?
As of the beginning of December, 2018, there are 93 JLG borrowers having loan
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overdue or defaulting three times in the instalment repayment. Most of these default
cases are old loans. One common reason for the default is that a borrower borrows
loans on behalf of others who do not have a good credit record. We have increased
our scrutiny and improved our screening process to avoid such cases.
5. What is the future of JLG loans?
We have a stable growth in JLG loans in recent years and expect to maintain such
growth. We are aware of the competition in this area and have been in discussion
on how to keep customers. One approach is to sanction higher amount of loans to
customers. We had a pilot project on a loan called Unnati which amounts Rs. 1
lakh with an interest rate of 20%. This can be a potential product for our JLG
clients who require bigger amount of loans with lower interest rate and have built
good credit record through JLG loans. This product is launched in August 2018
and it is for both individual and group.
Manisha Katte, Head of weekly market cash credit, Mann Deshi Bank
1. How did the bank come up with the weekly market cash credit prod-
ucts?
A few clients said to us that they only required certain proportion of loans for a
particular period of time. But with the loan terms, they will have to stick to the loan
amount sanctioned for the whole duration. It does not match with their business
cash flows. They might even spend the amount which does not need to put into
business. So we ran a cash diary for around 150 women vendors in 4 weekly markets
to capture the cash flows demand of vendors. We found that vendors take loans
in the morning when markets opened and mostly repay the amount before markets
closed in the afternoon. Also they found it too much hustle for them to go to the
bank and deal with loan issues while they were busy with their business. Many of
them also have business in different markets. So we launched our weekly market
cash credit which provides credit as request and door-step services.
2. What is the model of weekly market cash credit?
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Women, who have business in the market at least two years, form a group of 3 to get
a joint liability loan range from Rs20,000 to Rs40,000 over a period of 3 years. They
can withdraw cash anytime in the market where they have formed the group by
given a notice to the bank. They can repay the loans in any market where the bank
has agents. If any member defaults, other members will take up the repayment.
The interest rate of this product is 26%.
3. What are the challenges for this product? Any solutions?
Our repayment rate is 95% which is significantly lower than JLG loans. The main
problem is that group is formed in a particular market and if one member does not
turn up, it is quite costly to send agents to chase the repayment from residential
areas which could be quite disperse geographically. Also with a group of 3 members,
the repayment burden including the instalment would be quite heavy when default
of one member occurs. Then it will discourage the rest of members to pay their own
proportion. To deal with these issues, we increased the group size up to 5 in April
2018. Also we currently require members to cover the interest payment only for the
one who defaults.
4. What is the future of this product?
We currently have this product in 28 markets with 8 agents. Up to date, there
are around 2,600 accounts in six branches. The growth rate of this product is
quite promising. We are planning to explore more local markets which attract good
number of buyers and sellers from a good coverage of villages.
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1.6.2 Tables
Items Mann Deshi Industry Bank Credit Union or NBFI NGO Other
Cooperative
sample 107 5 2 67 29 3
Offices 8 109 377 21 133 35 13
Number of staff em-
ployed for one year or
more
74 470 1,397 268 581 376 44
Number of active
borrowers
13,870 382,745 1,541,944 57,013 426,927 191,305 23,486
Number of active
borrowers - Rural
178,884 484,917 3,771 197,093 149,210 17,293
Number of active
borrowers - Urban
103,127 501,514 53,242 117,821 63,572 6,193
Number of new bor-
rowers
9,302 123,157 97,613 17,538 218,140 21,961 13,397
Clients below
poverty line
59% 48% 40% 46% 55% 10%
Gross Loan Portfolio
(in Millions)
641 12,925 25,036 516 17,183 3,748 345
Gross Loan Portfolio
- Rural (in Millions)
3,919 9,628 58 4,314 3,533 213
Gross Loan Portfolio
- Urban (in Millions)
2,273 10,322 955 2,063 2,146 132
Gross Loan Portfolio
- SHG (in Millions)
540 - 58 1,157 14 -
Number of loans out-
standing
14,356 410,265 1,566,320 57,013 470,442 190,358 23,486
Number of loans out-
standing - SHG
35,352 - 3,771 75,687 1,410 -
Portfolio at risk >90
days
2.10% 2.50% 4.40% 0.70% 3.40% 1.00% 0.40%
Assets (in Millions) 1,122 15,033 36,927 688 21,097 843 208
Capital /asset ratio 14% 26% 39% 25% 24% 27% 31%
Deposits (in Mil-
lions)
975 6,116 14,018 437 9,961 88 94
CD_Ratio 66% 1149% 242% 232% 88% 2806% 128%
Paid in capital (in
Millions)
61 828 2,087 13 1,065 43 5
Profit (loss) (in Mil-
lions)
7 234 64 13 361 23 15
Social goals - women
empowerment
100% 61% 100% 100% 86% 31% 50%
Source: themix.org
Table 1.1: Summary of Microfinance Industry
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2016-17 SEWA* Mann Deshi
No. of Members 471,653 24,978
Total deposits (in Million Rs) 2,437.40 894.2
Loans & Advances (in Million Rs) 1,484.20 568.59
Profit (in Million Rs) 36.6 5.65
*https://www.sewabank.com/growth-profile.html
Table 1.2: SEWA vs Mann Deshi
Loan cycle Closed accounts Live accounts Total Proportion in total
1 4,694 7,525 12,219 69.03
38.42 61.58 100
2 1,706 2,026 ,3732 21.08
45.71 54.29 100
3 265 1,235 1,500 8.47
17.67 82.33 100
4 3 233 236 1.33
1.27 98.73 100
5 0 13 13 0.07
0 100 100
Total 6,668 11,032 17,700 100
37.67 62.33 100
Table 1.3: Number of loans in Loan cycles by account status
Loan cycle No. of loans Average increase in loan amount
1 12,219 _
2 3,732 56.11%
3 1,500 22.28%
4 236 15.82%
5 13 13.46%
Table 1.4: Increase in subsequent loan amounts
Year 10,000 12,000 15,000 18,000 20,000 30,000 Total Proportion in total
2011 101 0 10 0 0 0 111 1%
90.99 0 9.01 0 0 0 100
2012 564 0 65 0 5 0 634 5%
88.96 0 10.25 0 0.79 0 100
2013 367 0 921 75 1,081 0 2,444 21%
15.02 0 37.68 3.07 44.23 0 100
2014 6 0 328 0 3,961 6 4,301 36%
0.14 0 7.63 0 92.09 0.14 100
2015 0 1 208 0 3,962 280 4,451 37%
0 0.02 4.67 0 89.01 6.29 100
Total 1,038 1 1,532 75 9,009 286 11,941 100%
8.69 0.01 12.83 0.63 75.45 2.4 100
Table 1.5: First disbursed loan amount by year
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Items Weekly Market Cash Credit Loans Joint Liability Group Loans
Instalment Varies and flexible amount Equal and fixed amount
Loan received Depending on the withdrawal amount up to the limit Fixed lump sum at the beginning
Amount to be borrowed Decided by borrowers up to the limit Options fixed by bank
Type of loans Overdraft Term loan
Age 21-59 18-59
Group size 3 4-7
Credit limit 10,000 to 40,000
Loan Tenure 3 years 1 and 2 years
Interest rate 26%
Repayment frequency Weekly Weekly/Monthly
Repayment rate 95% 99%
Table 1.6: Weekly Market Cash Credit Loans vs Joint Liability Group Loans
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1.6.3 Figures
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Figure 1.1: Player wise break up of client outreach as of March 2017 (Source: The Bharat Micro-
finance Report 2017)
Figure 1.2: Player wise break up of loan portfolio as of March 2017 (Source: The Bharat Microfi-
nance Report 2017)
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Figure 1.3: The number of women reached through Mann Deshi Foundation’s Business Schools
and Chambers of Commerce 2012-2017 (Source: Mann Deshi Foundation Annual Report 2016-17)
Figure 1.4: Financial impact on women who attended Mann Deshi Foundation’s Business Schools
and Chambers of Commerce 2012-2017 (Source: Mann Deshi Foundation Annual Report 2016-17)
61
Figure 1.5: Increase in total annual income of all beneficiaries after training (in Crores) (Source:
Mann Deshi Foundation Annual Report 2016-17)
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Figure 1.6: Mann Deshi Mahila Co-operative Bank’s financial summary (Source: Mann Deshi
Bank Annual Report 2017-18)
Figure 1.7: Mann Deshi Mahila Co-operative Bank’s financial summary (Source: Mann Deshi
Bank Annual Report 2017-18)
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Figure 1.8: JLG Organisational Chart
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of borrower’s occupation
Figure 1.10: Distribution of borrower’s caste
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of borrower’s caste category
Figure 1.12: Distribution of borrower’s purpose of loan
66
Figure 1.13: JLG number and amount of loans by years
Figure 1.14: JLG number of loans by year and disbursement amount
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Chapter 2
Incentive Design in a Microfinance
Organisation
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Abstract
An important aspect of providing credit to the poor is the mechanism adopted by
the credit institutions to do so. Most microfinance banks, which have become a key
provider of credit in developing countries use agents to acquire new borrowers, man-
age the account and collect repayments. This paper studies the incentives provided
to such financial agents and the effect such incentives had on the outcome desired by
the microfinance bank. Mann Deshi Bank, a microfinance bank operating in west-
ern India, changed its remuneration scheme from pure commission to a mix scheme
with a combination of a base salary and other incentives. This paper examines the
effect it had on the effort and the output of the agents by using a panel data of
39 agents working on the bank’s joint liability lending product for five years. The
results show that although the bank was able to reduce its wage bills for the loan
product, it came with the poorer performance by the agents. The supply of credit to
new borrowers reduced, both in terms of the rate of reaching out to new borrowers
as well as the loan amount disbursed to them. However, interestingly, borrowers
delay their repayments less with the agents on the mixed contract.
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2.1 Introduction
Recently provision of credit to the poor has received a lot of attention among de-
velopment economists (Bertrand et al., 2010, Dupas et al. (2017). A key reason
for this is that credit provision has been identified as an important mechanism to
improve the current and future welfare of the poor. Further, microfinance banks,
which mostly operate with social objectives, over the last two decades have become
the key institution in credit provision to the poor. An important aspect which in-
fluences the supply of credit is the cost of providing credit. Aspects, which increase
cost of credit, such as adverse selection, moral hazard and lack of collateral in devel-
oping countries have been studied both theoretically and empirically (Conning and
Udry, 2007). This paper studies the cost of handing out loans and collecting repay-
ments through financial agents. It analyses if a commission contract or a salaried
contract for compensating microfinance agents is a more efficient way of distributing
micro-credit.
Microfinance banks employ financial agents whose task is to get new borrowers,
manage loans and collect repayments. While repayments and borrower behaviour
have been widely studied, the empirical analysis of cost of supplying credit largely
been untouched. With access to detailed contract data for financial agents hired by
a microfinance bank operating in rural western India and the data of the individual
credit contracts, two types of contracts, the effectiveness of two kinds of contract,
commission wage contract and salaried contract are examined, in provision of micro-
credit. This paper looks into the performance of financial agents in terms of their
output, getting new agents and collecting repayments, under the two different kinds
of contracts.
It has been widely reported that credit markets fail to address the credit needs
of the poor in developing countries. The welfare impact of market failures in credit
markets in developing countries is exacerbated by the importance of credit for such
economies. As highlighted by Banerjee and Duflo (2007), a key aspect of developing
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countries is the larger proportion of small scale entrepreneurs and farmers. The
welfare of this section of the society is hindered by poor credit as improved credit
can increase scale and scope of the entrepreneurs and increase welfare. The other
aspect is that since the poor live at the margin, any negative income shock like
sickness or short term ill health leaves them severely short of resources to meet their
daily requirements like food, health and education (see Binswanger, Khandekar and
Rosenzweig (1993)). Given the importance of credit in improving welfare of poor
any mechanism to increase the supply of credit would be welfare enhancing.
This paper addresses and makes contribution in two areas, one, mechanisms to
improve provision of credit among poor in developing countries and two, providing
empirical evidence on how commission contracts influence choice of effort and out-
come in comparison to salaried wage contracts. The problem of providing credit
and identifying reasons for the failure of credit market has been studied in detail.
Recently, Dupas et al. (2012) looked at credit market in Kenya and the paper
identifies both, problems causing poor demand of credit and poor supply of credit.
Dupas et al. (2017) studied the transaction costs arising in Malawi, Uganda and
Chile. Karlan and Zinman (2009) have also quantified the transaction costs arising
in credit markets in developing economies, where they show that default in credit
markets in South Africa can be explained largely by moral hazard and to a lesser
extent by adverse selection. This paper contributes to this discussion by analysing
another aspect of credit provision, that is, how should the agents supplying credit
and collecting repayments should be paid. This paper is attempting to find out
if by changing the contract form/structure of agents, who are engaged in handing
out loans and collecting repayments, credit market outcomes can be improved (more
borrowers, less delinquency and at a lower cost to the microfinance bank). This leads
to the second contribution which is to analyse if commission contracts perform bet-
ter than salaried wage contracts in terms of more borrowers, less delinquency and
at a lower cost to the microfinance bank. There has been some evidence about how
individuals respond to incentive contracts (Lazear, 2000). But there has been little
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or no evidence about how agents working in social enterprises respond to incentive
contracts. Governance mechanisms in social enterprises like a microfinance bank
has been analysed theoretically (Besley and Ghatak, 2005, 2017). While Besley
and Ghatak (2005) derive the contract for the agent whose interests are similarly
aligned with that of the social enterprise, Besley and Ghatak (2017) derives the
contract written for the managers of the social enterprise. The former shows that
with agents who are motivated to put in effort in line with the objective of the
enterprise/organisation a flat contract is optimal.
The organisation of interest and study is Mann Deshi Bank, one of the largest
microfinance banks in India, located in the western state of Maharashtra, India.
This bank lends exclusively to women and operates as a cooperative bank. Mann
Deshi Bank, changed its remuneration contract from pure commission to a mixed
one with a combination of a base salary and other incentives. This paper examines
the impact this change had on the output and effort level of the agents. A monthly
panel data of 39 agents who worked on the bank’s Joint Liability Group (JLG)
lending product for five years is used. The results show that although the bank was
able to reduce its wage bills for the loan product, it came with a poorer performance
by the agents. The supply of credit to new borrowers reduced, both in terms of the
rate of reaching out to new borrowers as well as the loan amount disbursed to them.
However, borrowers delay their repayments less with the salary based agents as
compared to the commission based agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the empirical
evidence on the effect of compensation packages on productivity. Section 3 describes
the Joint Liability Group (JLG) lending program ran by the Mann Deshi Bank
and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 illustrates the methodology applied.
Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
While there has been empirical work on agency theory, bulk of it has concentrated
on CEO compensation (Murphy, 1999). An interesting result which Murphy (1999)
finds is that firms which have external determined performance measure, CEOs re-
spond better to incentives. The study is elasticity of 177 incentive plans of US
listed companies for CEOs with respect to various measures such as revenue in
three industries (industrials, finance& insurance, and utilities). This approach is
using cross-firm data which may not capture other factors such as dynamic incen-
tives when no incentive pay is provided to workers (Paarsch and shearer, 1999). The
paper which is closest to ours in terms of analyzing incentives is Lazear (2000). In
this paper Lazear studies effect of a change in contract form from hourly wages to
a piece rate in an auto glass factory in 1994. The data covers 3,000 workers over a
period of 19 months. The paper finds introducing incentive contracts increased pro-
ductivity of the agents (with 44% increase in the level of output) but also attracted
more productive agents. An important feature of this study is the richness of the
data set used. Access to such contractual data and performance is often restricted,
particularly in the financial sector. Such data is important in developmental context.
There have been other papers which have analysed compensation in financial in-
termediaries. Chen et al (2006) look at how incentive contract can induce greater
risk taking. More recently there have been papers which have explained compensa-
tion in the financial sector and sensitivity of compensation schemes to performance.
Some papers like Axelson and Bond (2015), Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) have
provided an explanation in increased compensations and transaction cost (Also see
Ma, Tang and Gomez (2016) and Ben Naim and Sokolinski (2016)).
The literature on incentive schemes in MFIs is very limited although the im-
portance of incentive pay is widely recognized by MFIs (Armedariz de Aghion and
Morduch, 2005) with more than tenfold increase in the percentage of MFIs using
a staff incentive scheme from 1990 to 2003 (McKim and Hughart, 2005). Conning
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(1999) address the additional cost incurred to motivate credit agents select poor
borrowers. Bond and Rai(2002) and Jeon and Menicucci (2005) argue that credit
agents can be corrupted or dishonest. Studies by Besley and Ghatak (2005) as-
sumes motivated credit agents whereas Aubert, Janvry and Sadoulet (2009) argue
that extra audits are required to motivate agents to select the poor clients. Labie et
al. (2015) also show that agents discriminate clients because incentive contracts are
costly and limited budget for MFIs. A majority of studies on incentive schemes are
based on industrial firms but not on MFIs. This is due to the difficulty of quantifying
output and measuring the productivity in MFIs (Gramlich, 1976).
In development and social enterprise sector, there has been theoretical work in
analysing motivated agents, described above, in Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2017).
Transaction costs in credit markets have been highlighted, theoretically and empir-
ically, in credit markets in different papers like Dupas et al. (2017) and Dupas et
al(2012).
2.3 Mann Deshi Mahila Bank
2.3.1 An overview
Mann Deshi Mahila Sahakari Bank, founded in 1997, is a co-operative and non-
profit bank run by and for women. It serves mainly in Mann Taluka, of Satara
District in the Deccan plateau of Western Maharashtra. Mann Taluka, is known
to be a land of goat shepherds and it receives one of the lowest annual rainfalls in
India. The bank provides access to savings and credit to the rural poor women of the
region. Credit is provided through both, group lending and individual lending. The
bank also undertakes other activities such as training, support and empowerment
programs for women of the region. This it does with the aim of empowerment, asset
creation, leadership development, capacity building and property rights – through
economic activities. The bank is headquartered in Mhaswad, a village in the Mann
block. Currently, the bank operates seven branches. The first six branches are in
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Satara district, namely Mhaswad, Dahiwadi, Gondawale, Lonand, Satara and Vaduj
whereas the latest branch was opened in Pune district at Dhayri in 2013. The bank
enlarged the number of clients from 3,800 to 200,000 since 2000. The bank manages
a high repayment rate of 98% and is financially stable. It generates stable profit
and remains financially sustainable. Its operations cover more than 150 villages in
eastern Satara, as well as parts of Solapur and Sangali districts. The Reserve Bank
of India requires a co-operative bank to lend 60% to the sections of people who are
designated as ‘priority sector’. Mann Deshi Mahila Sahakari Bank surpasses the
expectations as 85% of its clients come from this sector. 70% of its clients come
from the backward castes. It is the first bank in the country to have more than
two thousand members from backward castes. Roughly half of its clients are street
vendors or day labourers and the other half mainly own small enterprises, including
tailoring, rope making and dairies.
As an activity of microfinance, the bank lends to individuals as well as groups.
Individuals can receive loans of less than 15,000 rupees with the signature of two
other women, who also serve as guarantors. Similar to the ‘Grameen model’, the
bank lends directly to groups (described below), as well.
There are four major types of products served by the bank through agents,
namely, pygmy savings, pygmy savings-linked loans, JLG loans and weekly mar-
ket credit. The two pygmy schemes are for individual borrowers whereas the last
two loans are for group borrowers. The JLG loan requires a group of 4 to 7 women
whereas the weekly market product requires a group of 3. Agents serve their clients
from loan application to repayment collection.
2.3.2 Joint Liability Group Loans (JLG loans)
The joint liability group lending product was launched in May 2011. It requires
a group of minimum 4 and maximum 7 women who have their residences or work
places within the radius of not more than one kilometer. The borrowers, who are
mostly entrepreneurs, have to be of age from 18 to 58 at the date of application.
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Applicants should be either married, widow or separated. Relatives are not allowed
to be in the same group. All members should be agreeable and willing to give
guarantee of repayment of other members’ loans. If an applicant already has an
existing loan with the bank, she would not be eligible for a JLG loan. The loan
amount is in a range of Rs 10,000 to Rs 20,000. The frequency of repayment can
be weekly or monthly. Normally for loans of Rs 15,000, it takes one year to repay
and for loans above Rs 15,000, it takes 1.5 or 2 years. The interest rate is 24% per
annum.
Over the period from May 2011 to January 2016, the product has been one of the
major profit contributors to the bank. There were in total 17,700 JLG loans issued.
Though most of the loans were served by agents, 1% of these loans were served by
employees due to some administrative issues such as the initial stage of JLG product
launch. The monthly average number of JLG loans issued was 316 (with standard
deviation of 204), the maximum number being 715 in October 2013. The first four
months since the product was launched were the trial period and then the product
rolled out. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show an upward trend of the number of loans
issued over the period with an annual cyclical pattern. Growth rate of the number
of loans issued in Figure 2.3 shows that the monthly growth rate in terms of the
number of loans issued had been relatively stable apart from July and August 2011
which are in the trial period. The average monthly growth rate of number of loans
was 9% with standard deviation of 0.45 after excluding the initial trial period. The
loan amounts have similar patterns as the number of loans.
By the end of January 2016, the number of loans issued to new clients was 12,219
out of 17,700 (total number of loans). This indicates this product is growing with
a large base of new customers. Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics for total
loans and new loans. There are 3,233 group loans in total.
The distribution of loan cycles is shown in Table 2.4. Among 17,700 clients,
8,487 clients only had the first loan and did not apply for the second loan by the
end of the sample period. But 7,207 accounts are still live accounts. This indicates
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that the product is still growing with strong customer base and these clients could
potentially come back for the second loan once the current loan ends. 25% of clients
had two loan cycles and 21% of clients had three loan cycles. The clients who took 4
loans narrowed down to 5% whereas only 65 clients took 5 loans. These figures show
customers did repeat loans. The average gap between two loans was 15 months with
standard deviation of 5. When loan cycle increased from 2 to 4, the gap increased
from 14 months to 17 months. But it went down to 14 months in the fifth loan.
The JLG agents
The agents play key roles in servicing JLG loans. Agents are recruited through
interviews by the branch managers and JLG head, based on their experience, edu-
cation background and potential. The bank then assigns the areas to agents. This
excludes the endogeneity problem in the analysis concerning the assignment of a
specific area to an agent.
Once the areas are decided, the agent promotes the JLG products in the area
by distributing flyers and organising meetings with potential clients to explain the
process of application. Meanwhile, the agent collects basic information about clients
in various ways including talking to them or visit their home. Once the due dili-
gence is performed, the agent is able to recommend the identified prospective “good
borrower” to the bank. This is the screening duties the bank expects the agent to
perform so as to avoid adverse selection of clients. Once the loan contract is signed,
the agent starts to collect repayment as per contract. It can be either weekly or
monthly schedule. However, the agent does not collect repayment from each group
members. Instead, the agent visits the premises of the group coordinator (each
group has a group coordinator), who collects the installment for the period from all
the members of her group and makes the repayment to the agent. The loan officers
and the JLG head follow up and monitor the performance of agents and their loan
profiles. In the whole process, the JLG agents remain in touch with clients very
frequently. If the clients don’t repay the loan, the agent is expected to take extra
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effort to collect the repayment.
From May 2011, since the beginning of the product, till May 2013, whoever was
appointed as a JLG agent would earn a commission of 3% of repayment amount
collected by him over the period of the past month. (Here onward, these agents
are referred as commission agent.) As shown in Table 2.5, after May 2013 the
bank decided to use a compensation scheme with a combination of a base salary of
Rs.8,000 and other incentives so as to reduce costs. (Here onward, these agents are
referred as salaried agent.) Hence, the incentive of the commission agent is based
on the repaid amount whereas that of salaried agent is based on the number and
amount of loans, and regular recollection of instalment. Agents are not allowed to
shift between different compensation schemes. When a salaried agent starts to work
in the bank under the mix scheme, for the first month, the base salary would be pro
rata according to the time they join.
There are in total 42 JLG agents who have served since the product was launched
in May 2011 until January 2016. The average employment period is 19 months with
standard deviation of 13 by January 2016. The longest employment period is 52
months and the shortest is 1 month. As of April 2016, there were 29 agents working.
Among them, 23 are under the new scheme with a base salary and other incentives.
The rest 6 are under commission. Among the ones who left, there were 8 agents
under commission and 5 under the new scheme.
The average monthly payment to an agent is Rs.10,367. The nominal average
daily wage for regular rural workers with above secondary education in India is
Rs.298.26 (monthly Rs.8,948) according to the 2011-12 NSSO data 1. The gap
between the opportunity cost justifies the long period agents stayed at their jobs in
Mann Deshi.
There is a punishment scheme established for agents. Salaried agents will lose
additional 25% of incentives for the month for each additional overdue account.
It was never applied in the window period. Also multiple sources from the bank
1http://mospi.nic.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/nss_report_554_31jan14.pdf
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confirmed that it was not even mentioned to the agents by the bank other than the
time they were appointed. It was required only after the demonetization in 2016.
The structure actually followed is more lenient than with original 25% cut in the
amount of incentives on each overdue account. But when it is applied, it is 20% cut
for each five accounts. Since the sample period is between 2013 till 2015, the impact
of the punishment scheme is not incorporated in the analysis.
2.4 Data description
There is complete data on 39 agents from different sources including questionnaires,
saving ledger accounts and clients’ files. The number of active agents fluctuated
from 2 to 27 over the period from September 2011 till January 2016 as shown in
Figure 2.4. The number of salaried agents started from 1 in June 2013 and reached to
21 in 2015. However, the number of commission agents started from 2 in September
2011 and kept increasing to 10 until March 2013. Then the number decreased to 6
by January 2015. The increase in the number of salaried agents and the decrease in
the number of commission agents confirms the policy change by the bank since 2013.
Most of the JLG agents presented uptrend performance in the first few months in
terms of the number of loans issued to new clients (Figure 2.5). Subsequently, the
number of new loans issued either stabilised or declined. This might be due to the
area saturation over the time period. Moreover, Figure 2.6 shows that the number
of new loans issued by commission agents tended to decrease over the period and
the same figure for salaried agents increased significantly. This could be explained
by the initial assignment of new areas to the salaried agents.
The characteristics of agents are summarized in the Table 2.1 for categorical vari-
ables and Table 2.2 for the the continuous variables for both the remuneration types.
Among the 39 agents, 11 agents are on the commission-based contract whereas the
remaining 28 agents are on the salary-based contract. There are 800 observations at
the agent-month level over a period of 51 months (November 2011 to January 2016).
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Out of which, 383 observations are for commission agents and 417 observations are
salaried agents. Furthermore, within the sample period the agents have issued a
total of 17,167 loans. Out of which, 8,315 loans are issued by commission agents
and the remaining 8,852 loans are issued by salaried agents.
An agent’s effort and performance can be affected by the following three factors –
agent’s risk appetite, agent’s skills and administrative setting. This paper attempts
to assess risk appetite of an agent by the information on gender, marriage, caste,
house roof, number of rooms, education, household location, land holdings, number
of family members, number of earners, proportion of earners in a household, share of
income contribution in the household and age (Table 2.6). It is assumed that skills
of agents would be captured by education, earlier finance experience and experience
in the bank itself. Information on the location type (rural or urban) of areas served
by the agent, repayment frequency, region (block) and whether a new area is being
served can reflect the administrative setting.
Regarding the categorical data, gender, marriage status, agent’s residential area,
house roof, previous experience in finance, repayment frequency and areas served are
reported. Considering only women can be borrowers of this bank, the gender of the
agents serving them may play a role in performance of the agents. Predominantly
agents are male with only 4 females who are equally divided into the two remunera-
tion schemes. Marital status of the agent might influence his risk preferences leading
to greater (or less) motivation to work. The number of agents who are married (20)
and agents who are unmarried (19) are practically same. However, the proportion
of unmarried agents are significantly larger in the salaried contract. Among married
agents, 9 are under commission contract while 11 are under the salaried contract.
The agent living in an urban area might have a higher opportunity cost to work
for the bank. Out of the total 39, 14 agents are residents in an urban area among
whom 3 are under the commission contract. The distribution of agents among the
four types of house roof is Reinforced Cement Concrete (RCC) (17), Sheets (14),
Tiles (6) and Other (1). The proportion of RCC show no significant difference
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between two remuneration schemes. But, the fact that most of agents have RCC
and sheets house roof suggests relatively better economic conditions relative to the
conditions in the area. The number of agents who have experience in finance is 12
whereas the remaining 27 agents do not have any experience in a finance related
field. Among those 12 experienced agents, 2 are under the commission contract
while the rest are in the salaried contract. The proportion of experienced agents
under two schemes are not significantly different.
21 agents out of the total 39 are in charge of loans based on a monthly repayment
frequency. It is worthy to note that commission agents do not have monthly repay-
ment collection. This is mainly because the monthly recollection loans are offered in
primarily large urban areas where the bank has expanded in later years only. The
areas agents cover are almost equally distributed with 19 in the rural areas and 20
in the urban areas. Among the urban areas, the distribution between the two re-
muneration packages is 3 agents under commission and 17 agents under the salaried
contract. Although areas served by the agents are assigned exogenously, the bank
takes the residential location of the agents in account while making the decision.
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics on the time-invariant continuous variables
of agent characteristics such as education level (measured by number of school years),
number of household members, proportion of earners in a household, income contri-
bution ratio, number of rooms and land holdings. The mean difference between the
two types of remuneration schemes for all the time-invariant variables are found to
be insignificant using a t-test.
The average number of school years of an agent is 13, which is in the range of
10 to 15. High school offers 10 years of education in this part of India, followed by
college for 5 years (first 2 in Junior college). Hence, in terms of education this does
not seem a very diverse group. The opportunity cost of getting education will also
be similar for all the agents.
The household composition of the agent may influence his risk preference and
motivation to work harder. The size of the family, the number of members of the
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family that earn as well as the total income of the family along with the agent’s
income are collected. The proportion of the earning members within the family and
the proportion of the agent’s income in the family income are further constructed.
Since, the differences within the agents of the two remuneration schemes are in-
significant, only the statistics of the whole group of agents are discussed here. The
average number of household members in an agent’s family is 5. Among the fam-
ily members, 1 to 3 are working and contribute to family income. The average of
earners ratio is 0.42 with a range of 0.17 to 1. The income contribution averages at
75%.
The assets owned by an agent may influence the risk appetite of the agent, the
number of rooms normalised by the number of family members has an average of
0.69 with a range of 0.2 to 1.3. Some agents own land, while others do not. The
average area of land owned by agents is 2.54 acre. Increased land ownership may
not only bring some efforts towards managing the land but can also lead to a lack
of motivation.
Most agents are in their late 20s with an average age of 27 years and that within
the salaried contract is 26. The average time an agent has been working in the
bank is 1.15 years with a range of 0 to 4.33 years. The agents consist of 15 caste
groups, in which, Maratha (11), Dhangar (6) and Mang (6) are the most common
castes among the agents. The caste composition of agents roughly correlates with
the proportion of population of caste in the area.
In the next section, the estimation method to evaluate the impact of the regime
change will be explained.
2.5 Empirical model and results
The effect of different compensation schemes on the performance of bank agents
at various points in a borrower’s loan cycle is examined. Specifically, this paper
studies two primary tasks assigned to an agent. First, to increase the number of new
84
borrowers to sign for the the Joint Liability Group (JLG) lending product. Second,
to collect repayment from the existing borrowers. While the bank does not observe
the actual effort being made by the agents, the bank has records of the number of
new borrowers and the current borrowers and how much each borrowers owes and
has repaid. So the outcome of the tasks the agents perform are both observable
and verifiable. Therefore the banks can potentially design payments based on these
observable and verifiable signals.
The primary aim of the bank is to increase the credit access for the poor, as per the
bank’s stated objectives, which translates into increasing the number of borrowers.
This forms a classic agency problem, where the agent exerts costly effort, and the
effort is not observable by the employer. The bank observes the number of new
clients and this can provide the bank with some information regarding the agent’s
effort level. The effort exerted by the agent at the point of signing new clients will
influence not only the number of new clients but also their quality. The more initial
effort the agent exerts in signing new clients, he/she will likely screen the clients
better (and therefore tackle adverse selection). The banks also would like the agent
to exert effort in collecting repayments as this one of the key aspects of functioning
of the bank. This will be affected by the effort made at the signing stage by the
agent since the better (less risky) borrowers screened and signed earlier will mean
that the agent will have to spend less effort to collect repayments. Here too, the
bank does not observe the agent’s effort but observes the collection made by the
agent.
In the context this paper is studying, the bank writes incentive contracts based
on repayment or collections. Here both the types of effort add up to increase col-
lection of repayments. It is assumed that more new clients will lead to greater
opportunity for more collection of repayment later. Also it is assumed that the
agent is risk averse, and the bank is risk neutral. This assumption is made on the
standard grounds that agent will be risk averse and that the bank which has greater
ability to diversify risks will be risk neutral. The agent has a non-negative outside
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option. If he/she refuses the offer made by the bank then the agent can look for
employment opportunity elsewhere. Given this standard principal agency model,
the main hypothesis for the analysis is that changing the contract type from com-
mission contract to a salary contract will adversely affect the two outcomes, signing
of new clients and instalment amount collected. As pointed out earlier, it is assumed
that the effort levels, both getting new agents and collecting repayments, contribute
towards the banks objective.
The performance for the efforts put in by the agent at two stages is measured.
At the beginning, the agent has to put efforts to get new clients. Here, considering
that there is no collateral, to avoid adverse selection, the screening is crucial. The
agents are able to get new clients only after this thorough screening process. It is the
objective of the bank to reach out to as many potential borrowers as possible and
so agent’s performance is measured in terms of the number of new clients attracted
by the agent in a given month. Low supply of credit is also identified as an issue for
microfinance clients and so the objective of the bank to provide bigger amount of
loans also checked here as the performance of the agent. The amount disbursed to
the new clients is also considered as a performance indicator of the agent because
of the efforts taken by the agent at this initial stage of the loan.
The second stage of the loan is recollection at monthly or weekly frequencies. The
regularity with which the clients are facilitated to repay the loans is also checked as
the performance of the agent. To avoid moral hazard, agent has to put in efforts
towards monitoring his clients. More efforts the agent takes to monitor, less number
of delays in repayment by the clients would be observed. It is important to note
that the delay in repayments is also impacted by the effort from first stage as better
screening would lead to more less risky borrowers, hence fewer delays.
Non-enforceability of the credit contracts without collateral is another issue faced
by the credit market. However, considering all loans were indeed repaid, the efforts
by the agent, if any, can’t be observed. However, the zero default in this product is
caused probably by the high standards of monitoring where delayed repayments are
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taken very seriously by the lender. Hence, it makes sense to carefully observe the
delays in repayment.
2.5.1 New clients and amount disbursed
The following regression model is estimated to understand the effect of the compen-
sation contract type on an agent’s performance,
ln(NCit) = δ0 + δSi + βXit +
B∑
b=1
θjI{i works in block b}
+
Y∑
y=1
ρyI{y = year(t)}+
M∑
m=1
ξmI{m = month(t)}+ αi + it,
(2.1)
where log(NCit) the log of number of new borrowers served by agent i in time
period t (month). S is the dummy variable for an agent’s compensation contract,
which holds a value 1 for salaried contract, 0 otherwise. X is the vector of all
other regressors, whereas θj, ρy and ξm measure block, year and month fixed effects
respectively. The block effects intend to capture the time invariant differences in
competition and market structure the bank may face from other lenders. Since most
blocks have only a single bank branch in them, block fixed effects also control for
differences in administration within the bank.2
An annual cyclical pattern in number of loans issued is shown in Figure 2.2,
with a trough in March and peak in September-October. Year and month dummy
variables are used to capture this seasonality effect. It is observed that when the
bank expands to a new area, finding new borrowers is easier in the beginning leading
to a spike in term of number of loans issued. This is often followed by a gradual
slow down and stabilisation. It might be occurring due to the untapped “good”
borrowers in the new area during the initial period.
The compensation contract offered has remained same throughout the tenure of
an agent. Hence, a random effects panel model is applied to consistently estimate
the parameter on compensation contract type as well as to control for all time
2Out of the five blocks, only one block has more than one bank branches in it.
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variable regressors such as age, experience in the bank, new areas and seasonality.
The same model is also used to estimate the effects of the policy variable on the
amount disbursed to new clients.
Estimation results
Table 2.6 shows the results of the random effects panel regression based on Equa-
tion 2.1. Column (1) doesn’t have any month, year or block fixed effects, whereas
column (2) includes the year and month fixed effects. Column (3) has all the fixed
effects and is preferred specification. Across the specifications, salaried agents get
70%-132% fewer new loans than the commission agents on a month-by-month basis.
This suggests that salaried agents perform significantly worse in terms of getting
new borrowers.
The control variables in the regression shed light on various aspects such as
risk appetite, motivation, social network and skills of an agent. In terms of risk
appetite, it is observed that family size has a positive impact on the performance
of agents. This can happen if an agent becomes more motivated due to increased
responsibilities. A negative sign on the number of earners suggests that as the
number of earners increases, the agent may have a lesser incentive to work harder.
Increased land holdings are correlated with reduced performance, possibly either
due to the agent slacking because of a better outside option or additional time is
spent to take care of the land. Also, proportion of earners and number of rooms in
a house are positively correlated with the performance of an agent. This can be due
to richer families have a better social network and economic status possibly leading
to an increased trust among borrowers.
With respect to skills, finance related prior experience is not significant and
education seems to only have a weak effect. However, experience in this job is
negatively correlated with the number of new borrowers. This can possibly be
attributed to an increased marginal effort over time since initially an agent’s primary
role is to attract new borrowers whereas later on the agent has to put effort in
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collections as well as getting new borrowers from an existing area which is likely
to get more saturated eventually. Also, urban areas have fewer loans as compared
to rural areas possibly because there is increased competition and borrowers have
other options to access credit.
As expected, agents in a new area attract more new borrowers.3 Agents serving
areas with monthly repayment frequency attract more borrowers, which could be a
sign of risk aversion.
Table 2.7 shows results for the loan amount disbursed to the new clients. The
estimated parameters have signs similar to the number of new loans regression. This
provides some robustness to the findings.
2.5.2 Delinquency
Other than getting new borrowers, a key function of the agents is to collect repay-
ments. This is part of managing the credit contract and monitoring the borrower.
While repayment rates are generally high, it is important for the bank that money is
repaid on time. So in order to measure the output of the effort resulting from mon-
itoring and recollecting, delay in repayment is used. Such a metric using borrowers’
deviation (delay) from the original repayment schedule as a measure of performance
is constructed. It is assumed that greater the effort employed by an agent in moni-
toring the borrowers, lesser borrowers will deviate from the repayment schedule.
Delinquency is defined as the number of times the installments were delayed
by two or more days during the loan tenure. A margin of two days allows the
analysis to account for any potential holidays and a possible delay in data input.
The delinquency ranges from 1 to 84 which seems large enough to capture qualitative
differences in the performance of the loan. A logit model using a borrower-level data
is estimated. The binary dependent variable is defined as 1 if the loan was delayed
by two or more days, for at least n number of times by a borrower. The model
separately for n = 1, 10, 25 and 35, which are the quartiles of the distribution of
3The new area dummy variable is defined to be 1 for the first three months, 0 otherwise.
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the number of delinquencies, is estimated.
Estimation results
Delinquency among loans which have delayed rarely (more than once) as well as
those which have delayed as many as 35 times is studied.4 Table 2.9 shows the
results of the logit regression for delinquency. Column 1 reports the results where
the loan repayment has been delayed more than once. Similarly, column 2-4 show
results with more than 10, 25 and 35 delays respectively. Across all specifications it
is observed that salaried agents experience fewer delays. The log odds ratio of a loan
being delinquent decreases by 0.938 if that loan is served by a salaried agent rather
than the one on commission. In other words, the odds ratio of being delinquent are
2.56 times lower among loans served by a salaried agent than those served by agents
under commission, keeping all other independent variables constant.
In all the specifications in Table 2.9, higher loan amounts are negatively correlated
with delays. This can happen as a higher amount borrower would have gone through
stringent credit checks and is a good proxy for creditworthiness. Although, a higher
loan amount also translates into bigger installments, it does not seem to affect the
repayments. Also, agents may be putting in a higher effort for large amount loans
as this is a higher priority for loan officers.5 Duration of a loan has a significantly
positive effect on delinquency. Longer duration of a loan implies higher number of
installments which intuitively leads to more delays. Other borrower characteristics
such as monthly income, number of rooms and number of phones are insignificant.
These variables intend to measure creditworthiness of a borrower which may already
be captured in the loan amount.
Most of the agent characteristics do not show any significant correlation with the
probability of delay. This suggests that apart from the type of compensation contract
of an agent, the identity of an agent has a little role to play in loan repayment. An
agent’s finance related experience in a previous job helps lower the delinquency.
4All loans have at least one delay.
5An agent reports directly to a loan officer in the Mann Deshi bank.
90
For loans delinquent only occasionally, land held by the agent can be one of the
reasons causing it. The occasional diversion of focus and efforts towards the land
on behalf of the agent might lead to this. A bigger family size of the agent seems
to be correlated to acquiring riskier borrowers. Overall, the results show that the
borrowers of the salaried agents are less delinquent, i.e, they delay less number of
times than those of commission agents. Hence, borrowers of the commission agents
perform worse on this measure, unlike acquiring of new borrowers as discussed in
the previous section.
2.6 Selection bias
A common concern with the above analysis is that the characteristics of the appli-
cants for an agent’s job may have changed in response to the change in the compen-
sation structure. This self-selection can potentially cause a bias in the parameter of
interest. However, the concerns were mitigated upon further exploration.
First, the job advertisements placed are mostly generic in nature and do not
explicitly specify the compensation structure. Figure 2.7 is a job advertisement
in Marathi which appeared in a local newspaper after the policy change and is
translated into English in Figure 2.8. The job advertisement only specifies that the
remuneration will be based upon prior experience and abilities. Also, in the discus-
sions with the CEO of Mann Deshi, product head and branch managers who are
responsible for interviewing and managing agents, they mentioned that no explicit
difference was noticed in the profile of the job applicants after the policy change.
Moreover, rural labour markets in India, large under and unemployment result in
buyers markets, so that the structure of compensation may have minimal affect on
participation decisions of potential employees.In Maharashtra, in 2013, around only
14 percent of rural households had wage earning members. Most households have
self-employed or entrepreneurs members. Another measure is how many households
depend on employment generation schemes: In Satara District, 14 percent 42 out of
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1000 households used state funded employment generation schemes, while the same
number was 52 for all of Maharashtra 6.
Another concern could be that once a salaried contract was offered, only a certain
type of applicants accepted the job offer. To address this issue, this paper estimates
a regression with agent contract type as the dependent variable and observed char-
acteristics as the independent variable. Table 2.8 reports the results where most
variables are insignificant (as well as the overall significance of the model) which
suggests that observed characteristics are similar across agent types.
2.7 Cost
The objective of the bank in shifting to the salaried contract was to reduce the wage
bill. Reducing the operating cost increases short-run liquidity of the bank, which
can potentially lead to providing credit to more borrowers. Using bank’s data, it is
found that the cost to the bank has significantly gone down by changing the contract
from a compensation based to a salaried one. The monthly average payment to a
salaried agents is Rs. 10,059 which is Rs. 644 less than that for the commission
agents. In other words, the commission agent got paid 7% more than the salaried
ones.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper addresses a classic question in economics, if providing incentives to
agents/employees can help the firm/organization achieve its goals more efficiently.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. One, a very rich data set is used
which allows this study to analyse the effectiveness of commission contracts. Often
empirical study of agency problems or incentive design is limited to CEO compen-
sation mainly due to data constraints. But here availability of the data on the
employees and their clients and that of the MFI make it possible to analyse that
6Report on District Level Estimates for the State of Maharashtra, 2013-2014
(https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/MH District Level Report.pdf)
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commission contracts can help align the performance of the agent with that of the
firm/organization’s objectives. The second contribution is that the analysis helps
address the question how credit can be made available to the poor at a lower cost.
Credit markets in developing countries suffer from various transaction costs and thus
the outcome in terms of credit provided to the poor is far below what it should be.
An important mechanism within this set up is how agents delivering and managing
credit contracts to the poor are governed. This aspect of transaction cost in credit
delivery to the poor is often not studied, but can still form an important part of an
intervention in credit delivery to the poor.
The results show that with the commission contract, the supply of credit is higher
in terms of reaching out to more number of potential borrowers as well as being able
to lend greater amount. Interestingly, while it is found that under commission
contracts, agents sign more new borrowers, there is also a greater amount of delay
in repayment. It is likely that either the agents who are paid under commission
contracts are selecting borrowers who are more risky, not monitoring borrowers or
they are putting in less effort to collect repayments from the borrower. It is probably
either agents selecting more risky borrowers or spending less effort in monitoring
borrowers, since the agents are paid commission on the amount collected and so
are likely to spend effort on collection or repayment. Similar results of incentives
leading to riskier portfolios have been documented in the literature (see Efing, Hau,
Kampkötter and Steinbrecherare, 2015). The agent may find it easier to get new
borrowers, given the lack of credit in the market, than managing the borrowers at
the later stage of the contract. There is a lack of data to identify how the agent
distributes his/her effort during the whole contractual process. Also the salaried
agent is less eager to increase the number of borrowers and this perhaps ensures a
higher quality of borrowers relative to the portfolio of a commission contract agent.
Finally, while incentive provision can be effective, the observable signal on which
the incentive is provided has to be in line with the objective of the organisation/firm
and if there is an element of multi-tasking then the incentive has to be on the task
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which is most beneficial to the organisation and clearly measurable. To this end, it
is found that even for a non-profit organization like the MFI, commission contracts
help align the interest of the MFI, whose main objective is to increase the number
of borrowers, with that of the agent.
Inability to determine the effects of the contract change in various types of efforts
that the agents perform which ultimately has an effect on the out comes studied here
has been the limitation of this work. This not being a field experiment, we have had
no control over the contract design. The commission-based contract is an incentive
contract but the mixed contract has a components of fixed salary and incentives
which technically is not a pure salary-based contract. Second, agents’ cost function
is not measurable. The components of cost function could have measures of various
types of efforts. For example, time spent in collection, time spent in visiting new
areas, distance travelled, number the period of phone calls made to chase delayed
instalments. Hence, the marginal effect of the change in contract on various types
of efforts has not been possible to tease out.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Data collection
Information of agents
A questionnaire (in Marathi) was developed to collect demographic information and
was distributed to those who have worked as JLG agents.7 For those who did not
respond, phone calls were made to collect information. The questionnaire starts
with the demographic questions regarding the agent herself. For example, name,
age, gender, marital status, caste, education, religion, address, contact information
and so on. To get a sense of the risk appetite of agents, the information on income
and wealth belonging to the household was to be collected. For the agent to under-
stand the questions easily, the same format was used as which the bank uses in the
clients’ application form. So the agent would be very familiar with these questions.
Questions including house (number of rooms, roof, wall and owner), bulls, buffaloes,
cows, goats, phones, fridges, TVs, gas cylinders, bikes, motorbikes, farmland and to-
tal value of assets are checked. The information of family members such as name,
age, gender, education, relationship, income, current job and village of birth is also
included. Furthermore, the information on an agent’s household monthly income
and expenditure is checked. Moreover, areas covered and remuneration type in the
current job are asked and then are cross-checked from the head of JLG product in
the bank as well as the branch managers and loan officers at the respective branches.
These are to confirm the shift from commission to salaried remuneration package
and the replacement of agents when there is someone leaving. The previous work
experience (job, location, period, salary) is collected to find out if an agent had
any previous experience which might have positive impact on her performance such
as working in the finance industry. The names of the competitors in the areas are
also asked to find out the outside option in the area she works. Among 42 agents,
information on 39 agents was collected.
7Refer to Figure 2.9 in the appendix for details.
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Regarding the remuneration paid to agents, the main source is tax deducted at
source (TDS) files which are stored at the head office of the bank. This records the
pay to all the agents of the bank every month which is used for tax purposes. 37
agents’ information is collected from these files. All these 37 agents also filled in the
questionnaires. To ensure the accuracy of the pay data, the saving ledger accounts
of agents, where the remuneration is paid, is also collected. This is used to cross
check the remuneration paid data from TDS files and record information for the
remaining two agents out of the 39 who filled in the questionnaires.
Information of clients/borrowers
The JLG clients’ loan accounts are stored in the bank’s internal system which records
loan information such as customer id, loan amount, account open date, account
status and so on. It started from September 2009 and records data till May 2016.
To link with agents who manage the account, this client (borrower) file is merged
with the consultant file which has account-level information together with the agents
who serve the accounts and group numbers. Lastly, to identify the delinquencies
client ledger accounts were collected which record the loan repayment information
and merged with the agent data.
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2.9.2 Tables
Variable Category Agents Agent-Months Loans disbursedC S Total C S Total C S Total
Gender Male 9 26 35 310 391 701 6,598 8,339 14,937Female 2 2 4 73 26 99 1,717 513 2,230
Marriage Unmarried 2 17 19 97 254 351 1,836 5,635 7,471Married 9 11 20 286 163 449 6,479 3,217 9,696
Residential area Rural 8 17 25 325 234 559 7,137 4,784 11,921Urban 3 11 14 58 183 241 1,178 4,068 5,246
House roof
RCC 3 14 17 109 228 337 2,487 5,143 7,630
Sheets 6 8 14 192 122 314 4,061 2,279 6,340
Tiles 1 5 6 31 58 89 733 1,242 1,975
Other 1 0 1 51 0 51 1,034 0 1,034
Previous Ex-
perience
No 9 18 27 299 300 599 6,411 6,021 12,432
in Finance Yes 2 10 12 84 117 201 1,904 2,831 4,735
Repayment Weekly 11 7 18 383 117 500 8,351 2,057 10,372
frequency Monthly 0 21 21 0 300 300 0 6,795 6,795
Areas served Rural 8 11 19 322 182 504 7,103 3,506 10,609Urban 3 17 20 61 235 296 1,212 5,346 6,558
Total 11 28 39 383 417 800 8,315 8,852 17,167
The observations are aggregated at the agent, agent-month and agent-month-loan levels.
Table 2.1: Frequency distribution of categorical variables for both commission (C) and salary (S)
based agents.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age C 30 4.79 19 41S 26 5.12 19 37
Education C 14 1.6 12 15S 13 1.7 10 15
Experience
C 1.56 1.07 0 4.33
S 0.78 0.6 0 2.5
Number of family members
C 5 1.64 2 6
S 4 1.38 1 6
Number of earners
C 1.5 0.76 1 3
S 1.7 0.75 1 3
Proportion of earners
C 0.35 0.29 0.17 1
S 0.44 0.26 0.17 1
Proportion of own income
C 0.85 0.29 0.24 1
S 0.71 0.26 0.33 1
Number of rooms
C 0.65 0.21 0.2 1
S 0.71 0.24 0.2 1.3
Land holdings
C 4.11 4.06 0 12
S 1.88 3.86 0 15
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of continuous variables for both commission (C) and salary (S)
based agents.
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Number of
loans
Mean Sum Min Max Standard De-
viation
Total loan amount 17,700 18,397 326,000,000 10,000 30,000 4,173
New loan amount 12,219 17,412 213,000,000 10,000 30,000 3,947
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of loans issued
Loan cycle No. of clients % of total Account statusLive Closed
1 8,487 0.48 7,207 1,280
2 4,464 0.25 2,144 2,320
3 3,792 0.21 1,371 2,421
4 892 0.05 285 607
5 65 0.004 25 40
Total 17,700 1 11,032 6,668
Table 2.4: Loan cycles of clients
Fixed monthly payout 8,000
Increment
First increment (When loan portfolio cross Rs. 3,000,000) 1,000
Second increment (When loan portfolio cross Rs. 4,500,000) 1,000
Incentive
Disbursement (Per account disbursed above 25 accounts in a month) 25
Collection
Per account collected above 50 accounts in monthly basis 3
Business target
Minimum account per month 25
Rule governing incentive
1. if all accounts with regular collection 1
2. if one account in overdue 0.75
3. if two accounts in overdue 0.5
4. if three accounts in overdue 0.4
5. if four accounts in overdue 0.25
6. if five accounts in overdue 0
Reimbursement policy
Rs. Per km for self bike 3
Limit of running per month in km 750
Mobile expense reimbursement monthly 150
Table 2.5: Contract details of the salaried agents
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Variables (1) (2) (3)
Compensation Scheme -0.533*** -0.561*** -0.840***
(0.179) (0.177) (0.242)
Gender -0.212 -0.161 -0.0193
(0.355) (0.351) (0.700)
Married 0.135 0.145 0.114
(0.175) (0.174) (0.183)
Age -0.00560 -0.00829 -0.0200
(0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0211)
Education 0.0965** 0.0999** 0.0994*
(0.0488) (0.0483) (0.0540)
Urban resident 0.0499 0.0269 0.0890
(0.166) (0.165) (0.202)
No. of family members 0.426** 0.450** 0.598***
(0.196) (0.193) (0.209)
No. of earners -0.717** -0.751** -0.901**
(0.341) (0.337) (0.353)
Proportion of earners 2.876*** 2.972*** 3.384***
(0.914) (0.904) (0.941)
Proportion of own income -0.409 -0.404 -0.0214
(0.416) (0.412) (0.474)
Land holdings -0.0903*** -0.0912*** -0.134***
(0.0239) (0.0236) (0.0386)
No. of rooms 1.220*** 1.232*** 1.464***
(0.423) (0.418) (0.478)
Prior finance experience 0.173 0.177 -0.0463
(0.184) (0.182) (0.597)
Experience -0.309*** -0.331*** -0.318***
(0.0492) (0.0496) (0.0515)
Urban area served -0.395* -0.431** -0.684**
(0.220) (0.217) (0.292)
Repayment frequency 1.004*** 1.051*** 1.672**
(0.285) (0.282) (0.672)
New area 0.408*** 0.367*** 0.381***
(0.0921) (0.0933) (0.0942)
Constant -0.285 -0.248 -0.941
(1.167) (1.159) (1.297)
House Roof FE Yes Yes Yes
Caste FE Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month FE No Yes Yes
Block FE No No Yes
Observations 712 712 712
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is log of the number of new loans.
Table 2.6: Random effects panel regression model
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Variables (1) (2) (3)
Compensation Scheme -0.920*** -0.979*** -1.565***
(0.155) (0.124) (0.165)
Gender 0.665** 0.660*** 1.050**
(0.304) (0.245) (0.475)
Married 0.244 0.234* 0.0653
(0.149) (0.121) (0.124)
Age -0.0336** -0.0340*** -0.0351**
(0.0160) (0.0128) (0.0143)
Education 0.182*** 0.178*** 0.226***
(0.0411) (0.0336) (0.0366)
Urban resident -0.170 -0.193* -0.142
(0.144) (0.115) (0.137)
No. of family members 0.453*** 0.459*** 0.799***
(0.164) (0.135) (0.142)
No. of earners -0.805*** -0.770*** -1.161***
(0.287) (0.235) (0.240)
Proportion of earners 3.195*** 3.157*** 3.887***
(0.776) (0.630) (0.639)
Proportion of own income 0.0825 0.146 0.509
(0.352) (0.287) (0.321)
Land holdings -0.0913*** -0.0913*** -0.185***
(0.0199) (0.0165) (0.0262)
No. of rooms 1.229*** 1.244*** 1.898***
(0.357) (0.292) (0.324)
Prior finance experience 0.0743 0.0696 -0.287
(0.157) (0.127) (0.405)
Experience 0.135*** 0.0809** 0.0789**
(0.0370) (0.0346) (0.0350)
Urban area served -0.736*** -0.716*** -1.444***
(0.187) (0.152) (0.198)
Repayment frequency 1.633*** 1.684*** 2.743***
(0.248) (0.197) (0.456)
New area 0.411*** 0.296*** 0.315***
(0.0676) (0.0650) (0.0639)
Constant 9.215*** 9.374*** 7.152***
(1.013) (0.808) (0.880)
House Roof FE Yes Yes Yes
Caste FE Yes Yes Yes
Year, Month FE No Yes Yes
Block FE No No Yes
Observations 713 713 713
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent variable is log of the amount of new loans.
Table 2.7: Random effects panel regression model
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(1) (2) (3)
Variables OLS Probit Logit
Female 0.107 0.429 0.488
(0.292) (1.039) (1.790)
Married 0.404** 2.240** 4.031**
(0.173) (0.934) (1.845)
Education -0.0195 -0.175 -0.287
(0.0539) (0.225) (0.415)
Earners Ratio 0.330 1.805 3.528
(0.386) (1.710) (3.185)
Experience -0.227 -1.368 -2.219
(0.182) (0.937) (1.644)
Rooms -0.310 -1.855 -3.079
(0.450) (2.051) (3.534)
Land 0.0192 0.120 0.197
(0.0251) (0.103) (0.182)
Urban -0.00344 -0.382 -0.540
(0.193) (0.727) (1.319)
Constant 0.462 1.169 1.273
(0.893) (3.319) (6.503)
Caste FE Yes Yes Yes
Houseroof FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37 37 37
P-value for overall signifinance 0.306 0.109 0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: Selection Bias
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Number of delays
1+ 10+ 25+ 35+
Compensation Scheme -0.938*** -0.602** -0.436* -0.829**
(0.324) (0.299) (0.228) (0.325)
Agent variables
Education -0.0219 -0.0108 -0.0350 0.154
(0.160) (0.0756) (0.0707) (0.117)
No. of family members -0.223 -0.123 -0.0991 0.436**
(0.251) (0.0844) (0.127) (0.192)
No. of earners 0.220 -0.0319 -0.0183 -0.172
(0.488) (0.214) (0.101) (0.150)
Land holdings 0.0750** 0.0313 -0.0215 -0.0381
(0.0350) (0.0296) (0.0243) (0.0352)
Finance experience 0.429 0.439* -0.582*** -0.0259
(0.522) (0.267) (0.164) (0.286)
Borrower variables
Monthly income -0.0189* -0.0117 -0.00709 0.00551
(0.0114) (0.00822) (0.00649) (0.00973)
No. of rooms 0.0113 0.0757 -0.0298 -0.0154
(0.0783) (0.0565) (0.0357) (0.0554)
Age 0.00813 -0.00221 0.000461 0.00335
(0.00889) (0.00714) (0.00438) (0.00650)
Loan amount -0.548*** -0.447*** -0.0836*** -0.280***
(0.0477) (0.0380) (0.0217) (0.0477)
Loan duration 0.0540*** 0.0645*** 0.141*** 0.265***
(0.00574) (0.00576) (0.00660) (0.0164)
Phone 0.0891 0.00852 0.139** 0.0124
(0.106) (0.0980) (0.0540) (0.0891)
Constant 10.30*** 7.125*** -6.879*** -23.26***
(2.584) (1.357) (1.220) (2.092)
Block FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.7885 0.7126 0.4166 0.6121
Observations 5,500 5,500 5,048 4,983
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The binary dependent variable is defined as 1 if number of delayed payments is
more than a specified threshold (1/10/25/35), otherwise 0.
Table 2.9: Logit regression model for borrower delinquency
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2.9.3 Figures
Figure 2.1: Number of loans issued
Figure 2.2: Number of loans issued by year
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Figure 2.3: Growth rate of number of loans issued
Figure 2.4: Number of active agents by month
107
Figure 2.5: Number of loans issued to new clients by agents assigned to new areas
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Figure 2.6: Number of loans issued to new clients by agent compensation scheme
Figure 2.7: Job advertisement placed by the bank after the policy change (Marathi)
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Figure 2.8: Graphs/Job advertisement placed by the bank after the policy change (English)
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Notes:
The questionnaire is given to agents requested the following information: name, age, gender, marital status, caste,
education, religion, address, demographic information on other household members, household expenditure and
income, areas served, remuneration type, previous work experience (job type, location, tenure, salary), assets ( house
(# rooms, roof and wall type), bulls, buffaloes, cows, goats, phones, fridges, TVs, gas cylinders, bikes, motorbikes,
farmland), total value of banks, subjective comments on: competitors, weakness/strengths of JLG products, bad
experience with borrowers, suggestions to improve the JLG product.
Figure 2.9: Questionnaire for agents
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Chapter 3
Does Legislating Greater
Transparency Boost Development?
113
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Abstract
This paper considers the efficacy of Right to Information Act (RTI) in India for
achieving developmental goals for poor Indian citizens. Nations worldwide have
enacted freedom of information to provide greater transparency to government op-
erations and to allow citizens to monitor their governments more effectively. Does
this lead to better public services? The efficacy of the RTI since its inception in
1997 is analyzed. Also, the kind of public goods which can be improved is identified.
Lastly, whether these public goods are beneficial for the poor population is exam-
ined. Two indicators are applied: electrification and health. Electrification is used
to understand how much attention a state pays to its rural voter- since electrification
is nearly complete in urban India. However, many rural areas either do not have
electricity connections or do not receive any electricity the whole week. For health,
an analysis of effect of RTI is employed on infant mortality. Infant mortality is a
key health outcome and a good indicator of the quality of health care provision in
a society. So a more accountable government due to RTI will provide better health
care and therefore the state or country is likely to have lower infant mortality. The
key explanatory variable in the study is RTI implementation.
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3.1 Introduction
Number of countries, including United States, United Kingdom, European Union
have enacted freedom of information in order to provide greater transparency to
the working of the state. In India the federal government passed the Right to
Information Act in 2005, which provides citizens rights to information regarding
functioning of various aspects of the government and its different activities. Before
2005, few individual states in India enacted similar right to information act. In
all these instances the main reason behind passing of such laws was to increase
accountability of the government. An important question here is whether greater
accountability can lead to better public services by the government. Besley and
Burgess (2002), Besley and Case (1995) have shown that greater transparency can
lead to better provision of public services, and the mechanism though which this
happens is that transparency increases accountability and this in turn leads to better
public services. This paper analyses and studies if in India, Right to Information
Act 2005 resulted in better public services. It attempts to identify the possible
mechanisms through which such laws can benefit people and increase welfare.
The government, especially democratically elected ones, can be considered to be
agents of the people to provide services for them. This relationship between the
electorate and the government creates an agency problem, where once the govern-
ment has been elected can choose not to provide services to people and ignore (the
needs of) the electorate. If there are mechanisms in place which can monitor the
government then like any other agency problem, the moral hazard can be reduced
and the government (agent) can be made to work for the interest of the electorate.
To increase monitoring and accountability of the government, one possible mecha-
nism is to make it easier (lower cost) to acquire information about the government,
its function, finances and the outcomes. Since the government will be aware that
unsatisfactory service to people will lead to losing in the election, it can be expected
that the government will take decisions and provide governance in line with the
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preference of the people. Hence introduction of Right to Information Act (RTI)
should lead to better governance and better public goods and services. And that is
the purpose to provide greater transparency to the citizens.
In principle enabling citizens to monitor their governments more effectively, can
improve outcomes, but the questions of what kind of outcomes improve , and whether
in a country like India this will benefit the poor should be asked. If for example,
certain aspects of political, social and economic outcomes matter more to the vot-
ing electorate then the government may design policies in favour of them and not
focus on other general policies. This could affect pro-poor policies. Example, if
the government believes that the urban population or the educated population are
more politically engaged and more likely to vote then they could ignore issues like
public good provision in rural areas like health, road and water. In the analysis
in this paper, two public goods are examined which help in understanding the ex-
tent to which the government will respond to voting electorate and to the general
population. Our choice of public services is influenced by the primary users of the
public good and if the public good is provided by the state and the central/federal
government. For this reason, the paper examines whether the implementation of
RTI has led to better provision of 1. Electrification and 2. Health.
Electricity is provided by both the state and the central government. While most
of the urban India is electrified or has household electricity connection, electrification
of rural India is highly heterogeneous with some areas/states having around half of
households either do not have electricity connections or do not receive any electricity
the whole week. A conjecture is that the government, state or central, may pay less
attention to the rural voter or RTI may have no effect on rural electrification since
the RTI requests are less likely to be from rural voters since they may be less
politically engaged, or have low levels of literacy and RTI as a mechanism becomes
less effective way of gathering information. The effect of RTI on infant mortality is
investigated. Infant mortality is a key health outcome and a good indicator of the
quality of health care provision in a society or a country. If heath care provision 42
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in the whole state or country improves, it will result in lower IMR. Therefore, the
measurement of IMR should reflect well on governance and the government. So a
possible conjecture is that a more accountable government due to RTI will provide
better health care and therefore the state or country is likely to have lower infant
mortality. The key explanatory variable in the study is RTI implementation. In
India, different states implemented the RTI act at different points of time, and then
finally in 2005 the federal government passed the RTI law for the whole country.
Great detail will be incorporated later. This staggered implementation of RTI is
used for identification purposes of our difference in difference analysis.
3.2 Literature Review
One of the key papers in this area of transparency is Besley and Burgess (2002). The
paper considers an agency relationship between the government and electorate, and
tests the hypothesis that a more open government will lead to better public service
provision. The variable for transparency considered in the paper is how competitive
the local press is, with more competition implying more transparency. The paper
finds that in areas where there is more competition among the press, there is the
state does a better job in handing out relief after floods. Adsera, Boix and Payne
(2003) also look at the link between informed electorate, and accountability of the
government and their performance and find that with more informed citizens gov-
ernment performance improves and there is a reduction in corruption. In a study
with a similar result (Stromberg (2005), finds that in United States areas with more
radio listeners (and thus better informed) received more public spending. Similar
results have been discussed by Snyder and Stromberg (2010) (also see Bannerji, Ku-
mar, Pande and Su (2011) for similar results, and see Pande (2011) and Olken and
Pande (2012) for two reviews on information and better governance). Enikolopov,
Petrova and Zhuravskaya (2011) find that there was greater likelihood of voting for
the opposition in areas where there was independent television access. There is also
118
related but slightly different results which highlight the limitation of the electorate
and the accountability of government and state. Cole, Healy and Werker (2012)
show that voters in India are myopic and look back only at the recent past perfor-
mance of the elected official when they vote. These authors have shown that the
electorate may not be the most effective principle. In a theoretical analysis Prat
(2005) shows that transparency need not lead to a better outcome for the principal.
The paper, which extends a standard principal agency problem, to distinguish be-
tween transparency about agent’s actions and consequences of the agent’s actions
and shows that transparency about agent’s action could be detrimental if the agent
resorts to conformist behavior. It is also well understood that due to multi-tasking
and the agent working towards different outcomes incentives may not work properly
and agency problem can persist. In the light of this existing results and more specif-
ically the Right to Information Act in India this study tests if more transparency is
better for the principal or the electorate.
3.3 Political Economy of RTI
Principal i.e., the electorate, lacking the information on the actions of the agent
i.e., government, may lead to inefficient utilisation of public resources. Right to
information to the citizens is expected to ameliorate the asymmetry of information
and enable society to achieve developmental goals quicker. How do we envisage
this legislation to bring about change in these outcomes? Dokeniya (2013) explains
the link in the chain of RTI results presented in figure 3.1. It is believed that the
legislation leads to the right to information which is then used by the citizens to
seek information and the government complies. The strength of this link in the
chain depends upon the type of information sought by the citizens and the type of
information disclosed by the public offices. The next link in the chain is about the
follow-up action. The strength of the link depends upon whether there is enough
mechanisms in place to make sure appropriate action is taken regarding the infor-
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mation revealed. Such as corruption punished, safeguards put in place and better
policies adopted. This is further expected to better governance with less corruption
and performance improvements. This then is supposed to offer returns with better
development outcomes. The act is expected to bring an important chunk of the in-
formation in the public domain. On the one hand private citizens as well as people’s
movements, non profit organisations, local political activists and groups happen to
assert accountability through by asking information from their public bodies. On
the other hand, the act also expects the governments (national, state as well as local
self governments) to be proactive in disclosing information. The specific feature of
RTI is provided under Section 4 of the Act, which mandated a proactive disclo-
sure of information by all public authorities, within 120 days from its enactment in
20051. This is to be followed up by providing as much information suo motu to the
public at regular intervals through various means of communications. Government
departments are supposed to provide information on functions of each department,
organisational flow chart with responsibilities, data on personnel and governing rules
for the office bearers. They are also expected to put the information in the public
domain about the plans of the department, budgets, allocation, subsidies offered,
expenses incurred as well as targets achieved.
The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) campaign made efforts to secure
the rights through the use of a slogan - “Our money, Our accounts.”2 This connection
continues to resonate in the use of RTI where people seek information to secure their
rights like getting a ration card (Public Distribution System card, which enables
people falling below poverty line to get access to subsidised food grains and essential
items sold through government shops)3 or get their passport issued in time4. Other
instances where RTI was used by citizens were to get the title of their land5 or even
1https://rti.gov.in/webactrti.htm
2Kidambi, Sowmya. 2008. Right to Know, Right to Live: Building a campaign for the right to information and
accountability. A Tactical Notebook published by the New Tactics Project of the Center for Victims of Torture.
Minneapolis, USA.
3Peisakhin, Leonid. 2012. "Transparency and Corruption: Evidence from India" Journal of Law and Economics
55(1): 129-149; Peisakhin, Leonid and Paul Pinto, 2010. "Is Transparency an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy?
Evidence from a Field-Experiment in India" Regulation and Governance 4(3): 261-280.
4https://www.moneylife.in/article/file-an-rti-application-if-you-do-not-get-your-passport-in-time/31149.html
5http://truecoloursofpune.blogspot.com/2011/06/farmer-invokes-rti-to-get-back-his-land.html
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get an LPG gas connection6. At a collective level, people have been using RTI to
demand accountability when their neighborhoods have been flooded7
3.4 Data
3.4.1 RTI
In 1975, the RTI got the legal support for the first time in Supreme Court case
of State of Utter Pradesh vs. Raj Narain8. No further development was made by
either the Central or the State Governments to implement a simple and effective
access to information regime although there have been numerous cases favoring
disclosure of government information and transparency. After 1990, there is higher
demand for RTI, especially from grassroots. The first and far most well-known
right to information movement in India was the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangahatan
(MKSS), an organization for the empowerment of landless workers and rural poor,
which begins its struggle for right to information in Rajasthan during the early 1990s.
The MKSS was trying to secure minimum wages under the government’s drought
relief program through the access of government records and documents. It found
out lots of misappropriation of government funds in infrastructure through getting
documents from the government. Then in 1994, it initiated fighting against local
corruption and exploitation through public hearing which disseminates information
including underpayment of wages to the public9. The social movements in Rajasthan
inspired people’s groups and organizations throughout the country (including the
National Campaign for People’s Right to Information, National Alliance of People’s
Movements, Rural Workers’ Campaign, and Dalit Sangharsh Samiti). In 1995, the
Press Council of India drafted a Freedom of Information Bill10. It addressed that
information which could not be denied to Parliament or State Legislature should
not be denied to a citizen. The Central Government enacted the Indian Freedom
6http://truecoloursofpune.blogspot.com/2011/04/hassled-over-delay-in-delivery-of-your.html
7http://truecoloursofpune.blogspot.com/2011/06/invoke-rti-if-your-neighbourhood-is.html
8https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court-judgments-on-rti-act-2005-wither-transparency/
9http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/1465_MKSS-web.pdf
10http://presscouncil.nic.in/OldWebsite/history.htm
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of Information Act in 2002 to respond to the national campaign for the enactment
of a central law on right to information. However, the Act was widely criticized for
its weak and ineffectual clauses and it never came into force due to no notification.
The encouraging breakthroughs are that various State RTI laws were passed during
this period, including TamilNadu (1997), Goa (1997), Rajasthan (2000), Karnataka
(2000), Delhi(2001), Maharashtra(2002), Assam(2002), Madhya Pradesh(2003) and
Jammu and Kshmir (2004)11.
The Right to Information Act was passed in 2005 by the United Progressive
Alliance I Government and was enacted by the Parliament of India to replace the old
Freedom of Information Act (2002)12. The RTI Act (2005)13 is “an Act to provide for
setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens to secure access to
information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency
and accountability in the working of every public authority, the constitution of a
Central Information Commission (CIC) and State Information Commissions and for
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.” The Act applies to the whole
of India except Jammu and Kashimir. There were two attempts to amend the Act
by the government since the launch of it but all failed. The implementation of
RTI faces many challenges. For example, there are no dedicated budgets for RTI
implementation at the central and state government levels. The government realized
the issue and started to allocate additional funds to help governments to set up
information commissions. Additionally, the central government launched a centrally
sponsored scheme which embedded 26.68 cores to strengthen the implementation of
the Act in 200814. The subcommittee set up by the Central Information Commission
also recommended central and state government to set aside a certain percentage of
departmental budgets for the implementation.
According to the annual report issued by Central Information Commission15, the
11http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/india/legislation.htm
12http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/content/national-level-rti
13https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf
14http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-
1343934891414/8787489-1344020463266/8788935-1399321576201/RTI_Case_Studies_Implementation- _WEBfi-
nal.pdf
15https://cic.gov.in/reports/37
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percentage of rejection of RTI application for all-India was 6.7% during 2016 and
2017 which is quite similar to the figure (6.62%) during 2015 to 2016. The gov-
ernment company under Companies Act (18.5%), subordinate office(11.48%) and
attached office(9.17%) were the top three public authorities which have the high-
est percentage of requests rejected. When it comes to the ministries and depart-
ments, Ministry of Finance (18.41%), Ministry of Home Affairs (16.08%), Ministry
of Labour & Employment (14.37%) had the highest rejected requests. It is interest-
ing to note that RTI application received dropped 6.1% in 2016-17 when comparing
to the figure in the previous year. By 2017, UP (83,054) led the list of appeals and
complaints followed by the CIC (47,756) and Karnataka (32,403). Mizoram (21)
and Meghalaya (63) had the lowest figures16.
The first step towards providing the right to information is to enact and make it
a legal right. India has a federal system and hence state as well as the union have
the ability to pass laws. RTI started getting legislated in states since year 1997 with
Tamil Nadu and the parliament enacted it in 2005. The state-level annual data is
collected for this study from Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative released in
2003. Considering the availability of the reliable data, 27 states are selected for the
period 28 years from the year of 1990 to 2017.
RTI was legislated in states since year 1997 with Tamil Nadu and the parliament
enacted it in 2005. Figure 3.2 shows that out of 27 states considered in the sample,
how the number of states with RTI increased over the years. It starts with 2 in
1997 and reaches to 8 by 2004. As parliament passed the RTI bill in 2005, all 27
states have RTI 2005 onward. Over the period from 1990 to 2005, starting in 1997,
out of 27 states considered, eight states passed the law before it was passed by the
parliament making it applicable for all the states. Over the window period, with 27
states for 28 years, there are 756 observations. For RTI variable as an independent
variable, both binary value and the time period value since it is enacted in the state
are taken. The binary variable RTI takes value 0 and 1, depending on whether the
16https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/up-tops-in-receiving-disposing-appeals-through-state-information-
commission/articleshow/63244066.cms
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state has RTI already applicable in it and not yet respectively. This binary variable
is used in the analysis over the period from 1994 to 2004 due to the availability of
control variables. The other RTI variable is a continuous variable to capture the
effects of RTI when taking into account that it will take some time to show the
effect. Longer the period since RTI legislation, greater might be the effect. Over
this period, as Table 3.1 reports, RTI period variables over the period of 2004 to
2011 has mean 4.07 and standard deviation 5.13. In other words, an average state
had RTI enacted for four years in the study period.
3.4.2 Household Electrification
Electricity consumption is used as a measure of provision of public goods. The
World Development Indicators (2007) show that low income countries have the low-
est access to electricity. There is a vast body of literature discussing the relationship
between electrification and economic growth. Ozturk (2010) summarizes four types
of relationship between electrification and economic growth and concludes that the
evidence on the causality between these two variables is mixed with different study
periods or different methodologies, even for the same country (Masih and Masih,
1996;Paul and Bhattacharya, 2004; Lee and Chang, 2007). However, the positive
welfare impacts of rural electrification in developing countries are widely documented
in the literature. The benefits include increase in labour supply, increase in school
enrolment, increase in household income and expenditure and reduction of poverty
(Filmer and Pritchett, 1998; Dinkelman, 2011; Khandker et al.2012; Khandker et
al. 2013)
In 2000, India accounted for 35% of the world’s total population without access
to electricity (1.6 billion)17. By 2015, the population without electricity access
reduced from 585 million in 2000 to 276 million (25% of total world’s population
lack of access to electricity)18. The national electrification rate in India in 2016 is
17http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/environment-
energy/www-ee-library/sustainable-energy/world-energy-assessment-energy-and-the-challenge-of-
sustainability/World%20Energy%20Assessment-2000.pdf
18https://www.iea.org/access2017/
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82%. The rural electrification rate is 74% whereas the urban electrification rate
is 97%19. This is due to the focus of government on improving electricity supply
in India, especially in rural areas, over the period. For example, the launch of
"Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana" scheme in 2015, costing Rs. 756 billion,
to provide electrification to 39.7 million rural households through 921 projects20.
Electricity is listed as one out of 47 items in the concurrent list which both the Union
and state governments have powers to legislate21. Therefore, by using household
electrification, both the state and aggregated level can be examined for the impact
of the Right to Information Act.
The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) under Ministry of Statistics
and Programme Implementation conducted an all-India survey of households peri-
odically to examine different data ranging from households to governments. Also
Census, 2001 and 2011 provides information of energy use as supplementary data.
In terms of electricity, the survey captures per 1000 distributions for rural and urban
households by primary source of energy used for lighting for 29 states. There are 27
states in the sample and the window period starts at 1994. There are in total 14
years in the dataset with years 1994, 95, 99, 2001, 2003 to 2012. The missing years
are due to either NSSO not conducting the surveys in those years or conducting
surveys with a focus on a particular item and hence this variable not collected.
Figure 3.3 shows all states average household electrification per year in rural
as well as urban areas. Rural household electrification is lower than the urban
throughout. Over the years, both rural and urban household electrification have
increased following a similar pattern. The growth rate of household electrification
in the rural area seems to be higher than that of the urban area. This is because
the marginal efforts and monetary cost of providing electrification to the additional
percent of households might be higher. This could be because the households left out
so far may represent the households which are poorer and not connected with state
19https://www.iea.org/energyaccess/database/
20https://www.recindia.nic.in/ddugjy
21https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf1/S7.pdf
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machinery in general. It might have legal issues such as absence or irregularities in
documents related to property rights, or technical difficulties such as distances in the
rural areas whereas crowded constructions in the urban areas. Households may have
electricity illegally obtained. The data used here will still capture that household
as having electricity. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 present the household electrification for
four groups of states based on the average electrification from 1992 to 1996. There
is an upward trend for all the four state groups. The trend is steeper for states with
lower electrification. Although the trend lines of groups do not intersect, they seem
to converge at the end of the sampling period.
3.4.3 Infant Mortality Rate
Infant mortality rate (IMR) is considered as one of the key measures of overall
health condition of a country. It is the number of deaths of infants under one-year
old per 1,000 live births. In 1990s, India topped the list of the countries with high
infant mortality rate (88.3 per 1,000 live births in 1990)22. By 2018, there are three
national health policies released targeted at reducing the rate. For example, in 2002,
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in India set a target infant mortality rate
of 30 per 1,000 live births by 2010. But the target was missed with an actual rate
of 4723. The Ministry revisited the plan and set the target of 28 by 201924 when
the rate for male was 39 and for female was 40 in 2017. Preston (1975) established
the relationship between mortality and economic development. Furthermore, infant
mortality rate shows positive impact on investments in education (Ram and Schultz,
1979; Preston, 1980;Meltzer 1992;Kalemi-Ozcan et al., 2000).
The state-level annual Infant Mortality Rates (IMR) data is collected from the
Handbook of Statistics on Indian States 25for the period from 1990 to 2016 for 27
states. Figure 3.4 shows all states average infant mortality rates per year in rural,
urban areas and overall. IMR is higher in rural areas than in urban areas throughout
22https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/reducing-child-mortality-india/
23https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/targets-fixed-15-years-ago-fact-check-on-repackaging-of-
national-health-policy-2017/story-1FbjE6PnKSMed1C6mp56II.html
24http://cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/National-Health-Policy.pdf
25https://rbi.org.in/Scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=17633
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the window period. It has steadily reduced every year over the period considered.
Figure 3.9 reports IMR for 27 states divided into four groups according to the
average IMR over the period of 1992 to 1996. All four groups show similar downward
trend. Higher the IMR of the group, steeper is the trend. Although the trends of
four groups tend to converge, the order between the groups does not change. Similar
pattern is observed from rural and urban IMR in Figure 3.10 and 3.11
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of all three IMR variables - IMR overall,
rural and urban. There are in total 658 observations across 27 states for infant
mortality rates ranging from minimum 3.37 per 1000 live births in a year in a state to
as high as 124 as a maximum with mean 46.5 and standard deviation 23.25. Odisha
and Madhya Pradesh, the states known for their poverty, over the period of 1990
to 1995 have IMR more than 100. It is shown that observe rural and urban divide
as rural mean 48.89 is higher than urban by 13.32 but both have lower standard
deviations as 21.93 & 20.32 respectively than the overall IMR standard deviation.
The gap of the average IMR between the rural and urban areas is because the poor
in the urban areas have greater access to the healthcare infrastructure than their
rural counterpart. Also, the overall average IMR is close to the rural average IMR
as these states are not very urbanized.
3.4.4 Descriptive Statistics
All the regressands considered here are highly dependent on the state and the year.
As seen above, there is a steady pattern of improvement over the period but there
can be stark differences within states. But there is a need to control for other factors
that may affect the regressands. Table 3.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of
these variables.
GDP per capita, a measure of how affluent the society is, may affect household
electrification. More affluent the society is, more household electrification is ex-
pected. This factor is also closely related to infant mortality. Wealthier people tend
to have better health condition including the lower infant mortality rate (Preston,
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1975 and Pritchett and Summers, 1996). Hence, GDP per capita for a state is im-
portant to account for in the analysis. The Per Capita Net State Domestic Product
at Factor Cost, adjusting at 2004-05 Constant Prices in thousand rupees averages at
33.25. The highest figure of 162.77 is Goa in 2015 whereas the lowest figure of 5.62
is Bihar in 1995. This matches with the average per capita income for the states
over the period, i.e. Bihar is the poorest state and Goa is the richest state.
The variable Industry measures the number of factories documented by the Hand-
book of Statistics on Indian States, it shows how industrialized a state is. More
industrialized a state is, greater population would demand household electricity.
Also, household electricity will be demanded with a greater intensity. The average
number of factories over the period is 6,363. Tamil Nadu had the largest number of
factories (37,878) in 2014 whereas Nagaland was the least industrialized state with
50 factories in 1990 since Nagaland is a topographically known not to be suitable
for industrial production.
When it comes to the proportion of irrigated land in a state, the higher the
proportion, more electrical distribution lines are more likely to reach out to the
irrigated land. So the water pumps can run more effectively, especially for the cash
crops. Since the lines have already reached, the marginal cost of achieving household
electrification in the area would be lower. Hence the proportion of irrigated land
in the total area of a state is collected. The average of this figure is 2%. Punjab,
known for its green revolution, has the highest proportion of irrigated land (8%) in
2013. Mizoran, a hilly state, has the lowest irrigated land in 1994.
With respect to the public debt a state runs, the lower it does, better might be the
governance. The average public debt proportion to GDP is 35% for all states over
the period. The state with the highest public debt proportion (132%) is Arunachal
Pradesh in 2009 but its average over the period is 50% which makes it the third state
having the high level public debt proportion. Mizoran’s average debt level over the
period tops the list of 27 states with more than 100% public debt proportion to
GDP. The state with the lowest public debt proportion is Delhi (21%) in 1994 and
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it remains at the bottom of the list throughout the period.
Also, denser the road network in a state, better connected the population is to
the outside world. It can link markets as well as provision of public services. The
length of roads in a state can be considered as a measure of the level of infrastructure
developed in the state. The road data is available from 2003 onward. The average
length of roads is 131,739 kilometers. Maharastra in 2014 has the longest road length
(608,690km) whereas Chandigarh in 2003 has the shortest road length (1,637km).
These two states remain the top and the bottom on the list in terms of road length
by 2017.
The infrastructure to supply the electricity can be captured by installed capacity.
This is a supply side variable. A very limited electricity supply can lead to lower
intensity demand for household electrification. The availability of the installed ca-
pacity starts from 2004 onward. The installed capacity has a mean of 6584MW. Ma-
harastra has the largest installed capacity of 40,376MW in 2015 whereas Chandigarh
has the lowest installed capacity of 79MW in 2004. Similar as road length, these
two states are the states with the largest and lowest installed capacity by 2017.
Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu are more developed in industry and infrastructure.
This has its roots in the colonial encounter where these states were the first ones
to develop a modern state system under the British raj. Nagaland and Meghalaya
are topographically difficult to develop infrastructure as they are in the foothills of
Himalaya with rocky terrain.
Education in a state can be considered as a measure of development as well as the
quality of governance in the state. This is particularly important also because the
effect of RTI can be dependent on the level of education in a state. Mass education
is one of the pioneering policies by the modern states which may affect the entire
population. Education and good governance are interdependent. Good governance
will ensure that the last child goes to school and receives a quality education. Con-
versely, mass education helps better monitoring of government action and deepens
democracy in a state by increasing participation of its citizens. There is a good
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amount of studies examining the impact of maternal education on infant mortality
(Caldwell, 1979). Education is captured by the number of students enrolled in class
ninth to twelfth in millions. The average number of students in all the states over
the period is 2.25 million. The state of Uttar Pradesh has the highest enrolment
of 50 million in 2007 whereas Mizoram has the lowest enrolment of 17,000 in 1991.
Greater urbanization might mean greater network of healthcare infrastructure. It
might also affect the employment and life style of the population from the urban
as well as the rural areas. Even for the rural population, urbanization would mean
shorter distance to urban locations. Urbanization is measured by urban population
divided by total population. The average of this figure is 35%. Chandigarh has the
highest urbanization with a ratio of 98.8% in 2017 whereas Himachal Pradesh has
the lowest urbanization with a ratio of 8.7% in 1991 and remains as the bottom of
the state list.
3.5 Methodology
A difference in difference method is applied to test the effects of RTI. The econo-
metric analysis is based on panel data regression. The equation below is the general
form for the regressions based on two types of RTI variables.
yst = δ0 + αs + ρt + β(RTI)st + δXst + st (3.1)
where yst is the dependent variable, household electrification or infant mortality
rate in state s in year t. αs is the state fixed effects and ρt is the year fixed effects.
The state fixed effects allow us to control for unobserved state-specific time-invariant
factors such as culture and geography. The year effect is expected to capture the
macroeconomic shocks common across states. (RTI)st will be a binary variable or a
continuous variable. The binary variable takes value equal to one if RTI is legislated
in the state by year t and zero otherwise. This binary variable intends to measure
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the policy impact irrespective of the number of years since the law was enacted
in the state. On the other hand, the continuous RTI variable is measured as the
number of years since RTI was legislated in the state s by year t. Xst are other
control variables selected according to the dependent variables in the regression.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Household electrification
The effect of having RTI legislated in the state on household electrification as pro-
posed in equation 3.1 is examined. To see the effect when plotting average household
electrification on year by RTI legislated states, it is shown in Figures 3.5 & 3.6. For
example, by year 1997, two states have already passed RTI Act. Hence, for that
year, the average rural household electrification for states with enacted RTI Act will
consider the average for those two states only. As time passes, there will be more
and more states getting added to the data when more states passed the Act. From
2005 onward, all 27 states passed the Act and the base for average HH electrification
for states with enacted RTI Act and all states will be on 27 states. Therefore, the
lines of average rural household electrification for states with enacted RTI Act and
all states finally will become the overall trend line while the line for states without
RTI Act will disappear. Same rule applies to urban household electrification.
Table 3.2 shows the results of regressions of Equation 3.1 for rural household
electrification over the period from 1994 to 2004. Column (1) has the regression only
on RTI binary along with state & year fixed effects. This doesn’t have any control
variables. Column (6) shows the regression along with all the control variables.
This is the most preferred specification. The states are grouped according to the
average y i.e., rural household electrification here, for the period from 1992 to 1996.
Each group consists of a quantile of states from the states which passed the law
prior to the union passing the law in 2004. The group also has the corresponding
quantile from the states which did not pass the law. There was not enough data
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available for six states and hence for household electrification 3 groups are formed.
Column (2) shows the results of regression on the sample which consists of states
from the highest tertile. Column (3) and (4) represent the results of regression on
the samples with the middle and lower tertiles respectively. Column (5) has all the
controls in column (6) and has two interaction variables added. The effect of RTI is
checked along with its simultaneous influence with Education and with per capita
GDP. Most results in this table are insignificant due to shortage of data as the data
window period ends in 2004 as RTI got applicable to all states then onward.
Table 3.3 is quite similar to Table 3.2 except the policy variable is RTI period
and additional control variables. This uses data all the way from 2004 up to year
2011 and also considers the effects of the number of years since RTI was enacted.
The results show a significant effect of having RTI legislated in the state across all
the specifications presented in the table. The basic results show that an additional
year of RTI legislated leads to a greater provision of household electrification in the
rural area. As mentioned above, again column (6) is the preferred specification. It
shows that legislating RTI in a state a year earlier leads to 4.11 percentage points
higher rural household electrification in a state at 1% significance level.
Column (5) also considers a joint influence of RTI with education and with per
capita GDP as compared to column (6). Even here, the effect of RTI remains positive
and significant with the magnitude not changing much. For the groups of states
within the tertile ranges, the states with the least proportion of households with
electrification in the rural area also have a very significant positive impact of RTI
legislating earlier. For the groups with medium and higher rural HH electrification
before RTI legislation started in India, the effect is significant only at 10% with
positive and negative sign respectively. This means that the majority of the effect of
RTI on the left side variable is coming from the states which had lower proportion
of household electrification at the start of the window period.
Comparing results between Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, it is shown that RTI’s effects
get highlighted more prominently in the later. It is quite expected as the later
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considers the data with longer duration and hence a greater number of observations.
It is also reasonable to say that RTI period, a discrete variable rather than a binary,
to capture the effect of RTI is more appropriate as it may take time for effect of
RTI to take place. The legislation is expected to lead to greater use of the right to
information probably leading further to a greater transparency and finally to more
efficient provision of public good. Hence, longer the period from enactment of the
transparency law, greater the effect expected.
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 have the specifications identical to Table 3.2 and Table 3.3
respectively except the left hand side variable now is Urban HH electrification in-
stead of the Rural. With RTI binary as a policy variable again in Table 3.4 the
effects of RTI are insignificant. As moving to Table 3.5 with RTI period as a policy
variable, a clear effect of the policy is observed. Column (6) presents the regression
with all the data and with the control variables. Having RTI registered a year earlier
in the state leads to 1.25 percentage points greater household electrification in the
urban area of the state. This result is significant at 1% significance level. Column
(5) shows the regression with interactions of RTI period with education and with
GDP. Here again the effect of RTI is positive and highly significant. For urban HH
electrification, the groups of states which were better off to start with, seem to have
been able to utilise the transparency law more to push electrification faster in their
urban areas. Hence, the effect of RTI over the years on achieving higher household
electrification in urban areas have probably come from the states which were already
better off in this aspect.
Household electrification in the state gets a boost both in rural and urban areas
by enacting RTI. But, this boost is prominent in rural areas in the states which
are not very advanced in this aspect whereas in the urban areas it helps the states
which are doing better than others. RTI is claimed to be a monitoring tool in the
hands of the citizens. The efficacy of this tool to improve the provision of public
goods probably comes from the citizens’ political might before this tool. This tool
might be beneficial only in the hands of the section of society which is politically
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less powerful as compared to the usual attributes of political power.
Section of society which is politically worse off but not necessarily equally worse
off in other characteristics such as income, education, status of own caste in caste
hierarchy, urbanisation etc. might be in a position to gain more with RTI. The urban
households from the states where HH electrification in the urban areas has already
been high, might have fallen behind due to lack of their connections to political
power centers. Ethnic identities play crucial role in Indian politics and numbers of
the ethnic group are vital in power share. It is often found that groups with bigger
number tend to enjoy greater political representation compared to their proportion
in the population. Hence, an ethnic minority might be better off with a monitoring
tool more than a majority. Hence, the urban households without electrification from
the states which have more urban HH electrification might be the ones without a
proportional political connections. With RTI they might be better off. Political
under representation may not be the reason behind the non-electrification of the
households in the states which haven’t been able to achieve much HH electrification
in the urban ares. Technical difficulties, lack of resources etc. might be the reasons.
Hence, a political tool to monitor the government may not be much helpful. On
the other hand, in case of electrification, the rural households rank after the urban
households and hence, the rural households without electrification from the states
which have fallen behind in rural household electrification, might be able to utilise
RTI to improve the efficiency of their government in serving them.
3.6.2 Infant mortality rate
Table 3.6 shows the results of regression where the dependent variable is Infant
mortality rate (overall, i.e, rural as well as urban), i.e., the number of deaths per
1,000 live births of children under one year of age over the period from 1991 to 2011.
IMR tables are also arranged in the similar manner to household electrification tables
above. Column (1) regresses IMR on RTI period and gives state fixed effects and
year fixed effects. This doesn’t show any significant effect of having RTI enacted
134
earlier on IMR. Columns (2) to (8) give regressions with various controls added.
Column (2) to (5) give regressions on state groups. In Column (2) only those states
which had infant mortality higher than the third quartile, both from the groups of
states which enacted RTI before the national act and those which did not. Column
(3) to (5) runs regression on the states which are part of the lower quartiles in the
order. Column (6) runs regression on all states but also controls for a combined
influence of RTI period with per capita income and with education. Column (7)
is the most preferred specification which uses all the states and controls for all the
necessary factors. Column (7) results show that having enacted the RTI earlier
leads to lower Infant mortality in the state. The act legislated by a year in advance
decreases IMR by 0.57 and it is significant at 10%. This regression also shows that
education also plays a significant role in reducing IMR. When looking at column (6)
results, it is shown that the combined effect of enacting RTI early and education
also happens to be significant. The effects of RTI depends on the citizen’s ability to
utilise the monitoring tool available. Education enables the members of the society
to use this tool. The regressions results presented in columns (2) to (5) show that
the positive effects of RTI on IMR can be observed only in the states where IMR
was neither too high nor too low at the beginning of the period. Similar to the
argument presented above in discussing HH Electrification, here again the effects
of RTI are observed in the states which are falling behind but not falling behind
too much. For the states with very high IMR, reasons need to be found probably
beyond monitoring. At the same time, the states which have achieved very low IMR,
state is probably already implemented its programs effectively, and hence RTI is not
that effective for this indicator. Again, the section of the society which contribute
to high IMR is not the one which can avail the RTI tool effectively. Also, certain
level of IMR is inevitable as it depends on the nature and the contemporary level
of advancements in medical science and technology.
Table 3.7 presents the results for regressions for rural IMR. The specifications
are as above in table 3.6. Column (1) represents results of regression only on RTI
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period along with state and year fixed effects. It shows that an infant is saved out
of every thousand infants every year by legislating RTI in the state. This result is
significant at 1% level of significance. As shown in column (7), the results remain
consistent even after employing all the relevant controls. The coefficient for RTI
period is -0.828 and significant at 5%. Checking for the combined effects of GDP
and Education with RTI period, there is no significant result. The coefficient for
RTI period also becomes insignificant. This shows that the combined effect of RTI
period with education is not very strong in the rural area as it was in the regression
for overall IMR presented in table 3.6. The regressions with state grouping based
on initial level of rural IMR informs us that the effect of RTI period is stronger and
significant in states which suffered more initially. The worst affect quarter of states
seems to benefit the most because of legislating RTI by being able to reduce their
rural IMR by 2.278 (significant at 5%) a year followed by the second worst quarter
of states which reduced it by 1.58 (significant at 1%). It is more challenging to
reduce IMR in the rural area and the states which are ahead of the median state in
reducing it probably suffer from issues which can’t be addressed easily by providing
a monitoring tool to its citizens; at least this particular tool.
Table 3.8 presents the results for regressions for urban IMR. The specifications
are as above in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. The results show that the effects of RTI on
urban Infant Mortality Rates are not conclusive. The results of the most preferred
specification presented in column (7) shows no significant effect of legislating RTI
on urban IMR. It is similar to the result found in column (1) where no control
variables are employed as well as in column (6) where the interactions are also
added. Columns (2) to (5) do not show a consistent pattern as columns (3) and (5)
results are negative but not significant whereas column (2) and (4), i.e., the highest
IMR initially and the third highest IMR initially respectively, show a positive and
significant (at 1% and 5% respectively). Here, the question remains whether this
monitoring tool has efficacy to enable certain sections of the society to monitor their
representatives better and in fact empowers them more such that the resources are
136
diverted towards providing the public goods better suited for them and hence might
be diverted away from the sections of society which are not in a position to avail
this tool.
Comparing the results for IMR presented in Tables 3.6, 3.7 & 3.8, legislating RTI
in the state leads to a greater efficiency in the government to achieve lower IMR
faster. But, this happens mainly in the rural area.
Ratio of Public debt to GDP and urbanisation seems to be factors leading to
higher IMR in rural as well as urban areas in the states. Ratio of Public debt to
GDP can be taken as the state government’s ability to govern. As expected, IMR is
more as this ratio increases. Urbanisation is another variable consistently positively
correlated to IMR. It is observed that urban population gets served better and hence
has lower IMR than the rural. However, it seems to be leading to greater IMR in
the population both rural and urban. It might have reasons in inter-state as well
as intra-state migration. The overburden of population on urban health facilities
leading to greater IMR in the urban areas. Greater urbanisation may also lead to
a lower political power to rural areas as the number reduces and that may lead to
slower reduction in IMR.
Comparing the effects of RTI legislation on HH electrification and IMR, the effects
are stronger in the rural area than the urban area. Considering the rural area, as
seen in Table 3.3 and 3.7 the effects of RTI period are more prominent for the states
which were falling behind in achieving their development goals in the first half of
the decade of ’90s. Both of the development goals considered here are more difficult
to achieve in the rural areas and that’s where RTI seems to be making greater
difference. In case of both development indicators considered here, RTI works more
in the states falling behind.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper the effectiveness of transparency is found in good governance. RTI
was introduced in India as way of increasing the openness of the way the state
functions. Similar laws have been enacted in number of countries, including UK,
Vietnam, Kenya and Sri Lanka, which allow citizens to gather information about
various aspects of the state and its functionaries. While earlier papers have analysed
how transparency increases the effectiveness of state delivery example in Besley and
Burgess (2002), this study documents a more competitive press and media resulted
in greater extent to which RTI works to increase the delivery of public services
by the state. The effect of RTI on the effectiveness of the state is some what
muted. The main mechanism through which RTI is supposed to work is with release
of information through the RTI. Citizens will able to monitor the public servants
better and if needed will vote to change the government during the elections. RTI
works in a specific way, the information asked in the RTI depends on who has
requested the RTI, what information is requested and is there a mechanism to make
the information publicly available. For example, the RTI is used mainly by the
educated and urban residents in India. As a result, RTI is expected to positively
affect delivery of certain kind of public services used by the urban and educated
but will not affect another set of public services. If this were true RTI would be
effective in delivery of public services meant for the educated and those living in
cities. In addition if there are complementarities in capacity of service provision
between cities and villages then positive effects will be found in the latter too. In
the analysis, delivery of health and electricity are examined. It is shown that RTI
has a positive effect on both electricity and in infant mortality. The effect on rural
outcome in both cases is positive, but in case of infant mortality the effect is greater.
The main limitation of this study is the unavailability of certain kinds of data.
The data in use is at a highly aggregated level. No data is available regarding various
links in a chain through which RTI legislation is expected to lead to better outcomes.
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The size of the information sought and the information disclosed by the governments
are expected to determine the effects on the outcome. However, defining the volume
of the data provided, the quality of the data, the ease of accessibility of the data
may not be observable and measurable. An index of the quantity and the quality of
the data is not available at this stage. Beyond this, to understand the efficacy of this
tool it would have been more useful to have a greater insight into those who have
been opting to seek information. For instance, demographic characteristics of the
citizens who have exercised this right, the frequency and type of information sought
by them etc. It would have also been useful to have more information regarding
the last link in term of the information sought and disclosed about the outcomes
studied. E.g. the number and types of questions sent through RTI regarding the
two outcomes examined here. This data has not been collected as it is not easily
available. Considering the difficulties in collecting this data, the time required is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
139
Bibliography
Adsera, A., Boix, C. & Payne, M. (2003), ‘Are you being served? political ac-
countability and quality of government’, The Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 19(2), 445–490.
Banerjee, A. V., Kumar, S., Pande, R. & Su, F. (2010), ‘Do informed voters make
better choices’, Experimental evidence from urban India .
Bank, W. (2010), ‘World development indicators, world bank’, Barakat, B., J.
Holler, et al.(2010)." The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Labour and Edu-
cation in Europe." Vienna Institute of Demography Working Papers .
Besley, T. & Burgess, R. (2002), ‘The political economy of government respon-
siveness: Theory and evidence from india’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics
117(4), 1415–1451.
URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:117:y:2002:i:4:p:1415-
1451.
Bhattacharyya, S. C. (2006), ‘Energy access problem of the poor in india: Is rural
electrification a remedy?’, Energy policy 34(18), 3387–3397.
Caldwell, J. C. (1979), ‘Education as a factor in mortality decline an examination
of nigerian data’, Population studies pp. 395–413.
Cleland, J. & Kaufmann, G. (1998), ‘Education, fertility and child survival: Unrav-
eling the links’, The methods and uses of anthropological demography pp. 128–152.
Cole, S., Healy, A. & Werker, E. (2012), ‘Do voters demand responsive govern-
ments? evidence from indian disaster relief’, Journal of Development Economics
97(2), 167–181.
Cook, P. (2011), ‘Infrastructure, rural electrification and development’, Energy for
Sustainable Development 15(3), 304–313.
140
Davis, M. (1998), ‘Rural household energy consumption: the effects of access to
electricity—evidence from south africa’, Energy Policy 26(3), 207–217.
Dinkelman, T. (2011), ‘The effects of rural electrification on employment: New
evidence from south africa’, American Economic Review 101(7), 3078–3108.
Dokeniya, A. (2013), Implimenting right to information: Lessons from experience,
techreport, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The
World Bank Group.
Enikolopov, R., Petrova, M. & Zhuravskaya, E. (2011), ‘Media and political persua-
sion: Evidence from russia’, American Economic Review 101(7), 3253–85.
Fay, M., Leipziger, D., Wodon, Q. & Yepes, T. (2005), ‘Achieving child-health-
related millennium development goals: The role of infrastructure’, World Devel-
opment 33(8), 1267–1284.
Filmer, D. & Pritchett, L. (1998), Estimating wealth effects without expenditure
data—or tears, in ‘Policy Research Working Paper 1980, The World’, Citeseer.
Khandker, S. R., Barnes, D. F. & Samad, H. A. (2013), ‘Welfare impacts of rural
electrification: A panel data analysis from vietnam’, Economic Development and
Cultural Change 61(3), 659–692.
Khandker, S. R., Samad, H. A., Ali, R. & Barnes, D. F. (2012), Who benefits most
from rural electrification? Evidence in India, The World Bank.
Kirubi, C., Jacobson, A., Kammen, D. M. & Mills, A. (2009), ‘Community-based
electric micro-grids can contribute to rural development: evidence from kenya’,
World development 37(7), 1208–1221.
Lee, C.-C. & Chang, C.-P. (2007), ‘Energy consumption and gdp revisited: a panel
analysis of developed and developing countries’, Energy Economics 29(6), 1206–
1223.
141
Masih, A. M. & Masih, R. (1997), ‘On the temporal causal relationship between en-
ergy consumption, real income, and prices: some new evidence from asian-energy
dependent nics based on a multivariate cointegration/vector error-correction ap-
proach’, Journal of policy modeling 19(4), 417–440.
Olken, B. A. & Pande, R. (2012), ‘Corruption in developing countries’, Annu. Rev.
Econ. 4(1), 479–509.
Pande, R. (2011), ‘Can informed voters enforce better governance? experiments in
low-income democracies’, Annu. Rev. Econ. 3(1), 215–237.
Paul, S. & Bhattacharya, R. N. (2004), ‘Causality between energy consumption
and economic growth in india: a note on conflicting results’, Energy economics
26(6), 977–983.
Prasad, G. & Dieden, S. (2007), ‘Does access to electricity enable the uptake of
small and medium enterprises in south africa’.
Prat, A. & Strömberg, D. (2005), ‘Commercial television and voter information’.
Ram, R. & Schultz, T. W. (1979), ‘Life span, health, savings, and productivity’,
Economic Development and Cultural Change 27(3), 399–421.
Rosenzweig, M. R. & Schultz, T. P. (1982), ‘Child mortality and fertility in colombia:
individual and community effects’, Health policy and education 2(3-4), 305–348.
Snyder, J. & StrÃ¶mberg, D. (2010), ‘Press coverage and political accountability’,
Journal of Political Economy 118(2), 355–408.
URL: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:118:y:2010:i:2:p:355-408
Wang, L. (2003), ‘Determinants of child mortality in ldcs: empirical findings from
demographic and health surveys’, Health policy 65(3), 277–299.
142
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Tables
variables count mean sd min max
IMR 658 46.49 23.24 3.37 124
RTI 756 0.51 0.5 0 1
Electrification Urban 272 91.72 8.22 56.7 100
Electrification Rural 268 65.54 28.03 4 100
GDP 638 33.25 23.12 5.62 162.77
Industry 579 6363.04 6987.07 50 37878
Road 338 131738.5 119662.6 1637 608690
Installed capacity 314 6583.86 7081.21 79.12 40376.21
Education 470 2.25 4.57 0.01 50.24
IMR Rural 658 48.88 21.93 0 125
IMR Urban 669 35.57 20.32 0 129
RTI period 756 4.07 5.13 0 21
Irrigation proportion 570 0.02 0.02 0 0.08
Public debt proportion 543 0.35 0.21 0 1.32
Urbanisation 702 0.35 0.21 0.08 0.98
RTI treated 756 0.29 0.45 0 1
Observations 756
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of all variables
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTI 1.884 -1.029 3.049 -7.984* -3.673 0.745
(2.070) (4.776) (4.506) (3.490) (7.707) (2.168)
Industry
(in Thou-
sand units)
-0.384 -0.853 3.346 -0.131 0.031
(1.801) (1.297) (2.145) (0.851) (0.820)
GDP PC in
’000 -0.921 2.402* 0.108 0.359 0.409
(1.131) (0.998) (1.516) (0.488) (0.451)
Irrigation
Proportion -2002.385 419.092 575.553 263.229 242.362
(1024.425) (602.486) (659.650) (290.681) (285.903)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
-119.589* -19.337 -45.787 -46.215* -46.960*
(54.270) (41.130) (40.774) (20.220) (19.993)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
-3.070 -3.815 7.817 0.057 0.095
(3.906) (2.260) (11.728) (1.490) (1.402)
Education
× RTI -2.810
(3.272)
GDP ×
RTI 0.474
(0.564)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 58.992*** 137.986** 27.286 9.443 54.850*** 51.753***
(2.374) (44.158) (26.728) (17.808) (13.629) (12.835)
Observations 99 36 32 27 98 98
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2: Rural Household Electrification on RTI binary
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTI Period 0.946* -2.477* 2.881* 3.845*** 4.606*** 4.110***
(0.460) (1.169) (1.074) (0.847) (0.431) (0.386)
Industry
(in Thou-
sand units)
1.026 -0.787 -5.802 -0.081 -0.370
(0.559) (0.686) (2.931) (0.347) (0.309)
GDP PC in
’000 0.871* 0.076 1.682 0.412 -0.556**
(0.341) (0.555) (0.848) (0.497) (0.200)
Irrigation
Proportion 732.373 -862.419 143.870 -761.863* -646.443
(497.762) (621.126) (562.662) (334.132) (337.409)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
112.557** -66.893 29.193 -11.350 -24.558
(34.374) (45.633) (17.825) (16.188) (15.298)
Road
length (in
Thousand
kms)
0.026 0.017 -0.014 0.020 0.014
(0.014) (0.025) (0.035) (0.014) (0.014)
Installed
Capacity
(in Thou-
sand Mega
Watts)
-0.529 2.298 0.620 0.274 0.374
(0.409) (1.595) (1.092) (0.403) (0.405)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
-0.301 0.010 -0.178 0.048 -0.085
(0.167) (0.135) (0.297) (0.120) (0.094)
Education
× RTI
period
-0.040
(0.025)
GDP ×
RTI period -0.059*
(0.028)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 62.718*** -17.507 95.979*** -10.055 76.582*** 110.613***
(2.443) (25.780) (22.835) (11.793) (18.362) (8.602)
Observations 268 42 44 35 130 130
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Rural Household Electrification on RTI period
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTI 0.424 0.288 -6.832 3.683 2.993 0.572
(1.880) (1.235) (4.968) (6.199) (6.953) (2.071)
Industry
(in Thou-
sand units)
-0.583 7.231* 3.156 -0.049 0.052
(0.367) (2.680) (3.327) (0.787) (0.772)
GDP PC in
’000 0.044 -0.940 0.136 -0.082 -0.174
(0.626) (1.124) (2.590) (0.471) (0.414)
Irrigation
Proportion -933.999* 987.150 359.432 492.821 497.760
(353.981) (491.007) (968.430) (280.609) (270.837)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
-37.352 -20.571 46.282 -9.469 -10.509
(31.687) (49.802) (56.275) (20.426) (20.145)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
0.216 -2.295 -10.245 -1.221 -1.588
(1.304) (1.876) (11.514) (1.415) (1.334)
Education
× RTI -1.706
(2.767)
GDP ×
RTI 0.067
(0.473)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 84.170*** 109.731*** 65.419*** 68.641 82.399*** 83.050***
(2.156) (14.677) (11.819) (33.706) (12.851) (12.241)
Observations 100 36 32 27 99 99
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Urban Household Electrification on RTI binary
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RTI Period -0.219 1.102* 1.747** 2.231 1.402*** 1.250***
(0.251) (0.491) (0.575) (1.454) (0.224) (0.201)
Industry
(in Thou-
sand units)
0.048 0.070 -6.365 0.195 0.029
(0.209) (0.296) (5.614) (0.182) (0.165)
GDP PC in
’000 -0.246 -0.341 -0.585 0.317 -0.159*
(0.185) (0.209) (1.178) (0.257) (0.078)
Irrigation
Proportion -81.749 -805.466 -1048.957* -683.500*** -638.560***
(275.146) (430.447) (467.632) (179.586) (179.848)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
-8.446 8.524 1.179 -1.079 -6.945
(19.626) (20.382) (18.709) (8.782) (8.325)
Road
length (in
Thousand
kms)
0.011 -0.020 0.011 0.009 0.006
(0.006) (0.026) (0.034) (0.008) (0.007)
Installed
Capacity
(in Thou-
sand Mega
Watts)
-0.219 0.061 0.989 -0.351 -0.266
(0.256) (0.732) (1.452) (0.216) (0.214)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
0.093 -0.128 -0.093 -0.103 -0.096
(0.096) (0.067) (0.243) (0.065) (0.051)
Education
× RTI
period
0.004
(0.014)
GDP ×
RTI period -0.028
(0.014)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 84.583*** 103.491*** 100.205*** 102.130*** 95.762*** 112.298***
(1.345) (9.696) (5.045) (19.803) (9.637) (4.662)
Observations 272 42 44 35 131 131
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Urban Household Electrification on RTI period
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RTI Period -0.365 0.807 -0.695* -1.505*** 0.605 -0.263 -0.570*
(0.283) (0.606) (0.287) (0.410) (0.716) (0.449) (0.285)
GDP PC in
’000 1.013** -0.199 0.016 -0.355* 0.197 0.203**
(0.312) (0.178) (0.168) (0.164) (0.117) (0.075)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
0.096 0.012 -0.243 -0.050 -0.007 -0.229*
(0.096) (0.164) (0.159) (0.965) (0.145) (0.095)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
42.051*** 11.443 -0.282 0.020 25.597*** 26.366***
(12.088) (8.147) (10.396) (7.537) (4.415) (4.348)
Urbanisation -250.945 8.819 129.317** -66.641* 104.740*** 108.143***
(238.028) (62.248) (47.150) (29.209) (19.504) (19.442)
GDP ×
RTI period -0.001
(0.006)
Education
× RTI
period
-0.062*
(0.031)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 71.409*** 134.916** 71.718*** 26.726 38.637*** 42.185*** 41.454***
(2.168) (43.084) (13.766) (18.229) (6.542) (5.260) (4.960)
Observations 504 92 100 107 95 394 394
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Infant Mortality
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RTI Period -0.873** -2.278** -1.580*** -1.036 0.987 -0.881 -0.828**
(0.299) (0.789) (0.317) (0.626) (0.917) (0.492) (0.313)
GDP PC in
’000 1.560** -0.440* -0.077 -0.538* 0.076 0.199*
(0.490) (0.170) (0.251) (0.216) (0.128) (0.082)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
0.294 -0.045 -0.256 0.767 0.060 -0.169
(0.288) (0.063) (0.191) (1.204) (0.159) (0.104)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
39.712* -26.243** 15.672* 13.347 18.645*** 20.497***
(16.693) (7.767) (5.997) (14.328) (4.833) (4.772)
Urbanisation -577.299** 132.982 97.905 -113.095** 72.425*** 78.175***
(168.106) (77.409) (50.641) (35.640) (21.352) (21.339)
GDP ×
RTI period 0.008
(0.007)
Education
× RTI
period
-0.065
(0.034)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 78.364*** 207.777*** 79.867*** 41.727*** 164.288*** 59.118*** 56.017***
(2.284) (38.248) (6.770) (10.678) (34.161) (5.758) (5.444)
Observations 503 92 118 107 77 394 394
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Rural Infant Mortality
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RTI Period 0.462 5.288*** -0.587 1.694** -0.198 -0.279 0.055
(0.321) (1.005) (0.598) (0.561) (0.937) (0.509) (0.322)
GDP PC in
’000 -0.153 0.138 -0.007 -0.139 0.000 0.123
(0.336) (0.222) (0.119) (0.252) (0.132) (0.084)
Students
enrolled in
Class 9th
to 12th (in
Millions)
0.163 -0.167 -0.296 -0.504 -0.121 -0.158
(0.117) (0.292) (0.285) (0.333) (0.165) (0.108)
Public
Debt Pro-
portion
17.807 -18.101 13.283 -0.048 11.214* 12.440*
(14.816) (11.833) (16.642) (9.424) (5.030) (4.935)
Urbanisation 410.603** -20.334 87.977 -13.658 81.871*** 84.833***
(150.839) (73.436) (91.348) (38.229) (21.678) (21.514)
GDP ×
RTI period 0.008
(0.007)
Education
× RTI
period
-0.010
(0.035)
State fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
constant 47.087*** 41.301** 56.846*** 29.307 20.434** 26.284*** 23.718***
(2.463) (13.876) (9.145) (24.250) (7.654) (5.904) (5.537)
Observations 514 110 82 105 106 403 403
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Urban Infant Mortality
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3.8.2 Figures
Figure 3.1: RTI Results Chain (Source: Anupama Dokeniya, Implimenting Right to Information:
Lessons from Experience, IBRD, The World Bank Group)
Figure 3.2: Number of states with RTI by years
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Figure 3.3: Average Household Electrification on year
Figure 3.4: Average Infant Mortality Rate on year
152
Figure 3.5: Average Rural HH Electrification on year by RTI
Figure 3.6: Average Urban HH Electrification on year by RTI
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Figure 3.7: Rural HH Electrification on year by group
Figure 3.8: Urban HH Electrification on year by group
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Figure 3.9: Infant Mortality Rate on year by group
Figure 3.10: Rural Infant Mortality Rate on year by group
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Figure 3.11: Urban Infant Mortality Rate on year by group
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